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Report by the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representatives of Pakistan on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a note verbale dated 26 August 2004 from the Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the United Nations stating that Mr. Khalil-ur-Rahman Hashmi and Mr. Bilal Hayee have been appointed alternate representatives of Pakistan on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, this note verbale constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

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Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Security Council the eighteenth quarterly report on the activities of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) (see annex). It is submitted by the Acting Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999) of 17 December 1999.

04-47028 (E) 080904

Annex

Eighteenth quarterly report on the activities of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission submitted in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999)

I. Introduction

1. The present report, which is the eighteenth[a] submitted in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), covers the activities of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) during the period from 1 June to 31 August 2004.

II. Developments

2. During the period under review, the Acting Executive Chairman has continued the practice of briefing the respective Presidents of the Security Council, representatives of Member States and officials of the Secretariat on the activities of UNMOVIC.

Investigations into scrap material found outside Iraq

3. The Commission has continued its investigation into the discovery of items relevant to its mandate that have been exported from Iraq as scrap metal. At the beginning of June, Commission experts went to Jordan and with the support and cooperation of Jordanian authorities visited a number of trading companies dealing with the export of scrap metal from Iraq to Jordan. They visited scrapyards associated with the respective trading companies and interviewed relevant personnel, including trading company managers, merchants and truck drivers of Jordanian and Iraqi nationality.

4. A significant number of items relevant to the UNMOVIC mandate were observed at the scrapyards. They included 20 SA-2 missile engines, a solid propellant-mixing vessel tagged by UNMOVIC during its 2002-2003 inspection activities in Iraq, fragmented remains of an SA-2 airframe and booster, as well as four chemical-related vessels made of corrosion-resistant material that had been tagged by the Commission as dual-use items. According to information received from the trading company representatives, the tagged chemical vessels had been dismantled from the chemical industrial complex near Fallujah. The Commission's experts were able to confirm that information by comparing the serial numbers of the United Nations tags still attached to the vessels with information in the UNMOVIC database.

5. During interviews conducted with more than 20 persons involved in the scrap metal trade, it was determined that the first scrap metal started arriving in Jordan

[a] The Commission's 17 previous reports were issued as documents S/2000/516, S/2000/835, S/2000/1134, S/2001/177, S/2001/515, S/2001/833, S/2001/1126, S/2002/195, S/2002/606, S/2002/981, S/2002/1303, S/2003/232, S/2003/580, S/2003/844, S/2003/1135, S/2004/160 and S/2004/435.

from Iraq in June 2003. The flow of stainless steel and other more valuable alloys commenced later in the summer and continued in 2004. A rough estimate made by scrap company managers was that a total of 60,000 tons of Iraqi scrap metal had passed through Jordan's largest free trade zone in 2003 and an additional 70,000 tons up until June 2004. UNMOVIC experts were told that that amount comprised only a small part of all scrap materials exported from Iraq to the other countries that border Iraq and further to Europe, North Africa and Asia. It was also said that a lot of high-quality industrial production equipment from facilities all over Iraq had been purchased by unnamed contractors at low cost, dismantled and moved out of the country. If correct, this could include equipment subject to monitoring in Iraq.

6. According to some of the merchants, the authorities in Iraq had overall control of the scrap export business. Several sites that were monitored previously by UNMOVIC were mentioned as having been razed. Information on the web site of the Iraqi Ministry of Trade (www.motiraq.org) sets out the licensing and other procedures for the export of scrap. There are seven stipulated border crossings to all of Iraq's neighbouring countries, via which scrap metals can be exported. The Iraqi port of Umm Qasr is also authorized to trade directly with the rest of the world.

7. Following the visit to Jordan, information was received from the Government of the Netherlands of the discovery in early July by a Rotterdam scrap company of an additional 22 SA-2 missile engines in a shipment from Turkey. The Commission requested the support of the Government of Turkey to facilitate a visit by UNMOVIC experts to a Turkish company believed to be involved in the trading of scrap originating in Iraq.

8. With the cooperation of the Government of Turkey, a team of UNMOVIC and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) experts visited an Istanbul scrapyard in the second half of July 2004. No items of relevance to UNMOVIC were found at the yard of the company. The team was told that the Turkish company only acted as a transit broker for scrap metal originating in Iraq. Turkish customs officials later explained that scrap from Iraq was transported through Turkey under seal to customs clearing yards, where it was loaded into containers for onward shipment to foreign markets. The experts observed the removal of customs tags from one of the trucks arriving from Iraq. While they were not able to witness the unloading of the truck into the container, a cursory examination of the upper layers of the load did not reveal any items related to Iraq's past weapons programmes or materials subject to monitoring. When questioned, no one recalled seeing any missile engines or other materials relevant to UNMOVIC, but it was stated that it was quite possible that some had passed through Turkey.

9. With the agreement of the relevant Member States, UNMOVIC intends to observe the destruction of the SA-2 missile engines located in Jordan and the Netherlands together with other tagged and dual-use equipment that had been under monitoring in Iraq. All identifying data have been recorded and photographs have been taken.

Sites and equipment subject to monitoring

10. Using commercially available satellite imagery, the Commission continues to assess the status of sites subject to monitoring that were damaged during the war and more recently in some cases completely razed. Those sites contained a range of dual-use equipment and materials that are part of the UNMOVIC inventory of

monitored items. The systematic removal of items subject to monitoring affects the Commission's ability to maintain an accurate and up-to-date assessment of Iraq's capabilities. The fate of the equipment and materials is unknown (except for those which have been identified in scrapyards outside Iraq).

11. The following two examples illustrate the types of site that have been razed or cleaned up and the dual-use equipment and material known to have been there, the fate of which remains unknown (only the most important and tagged equipment is mentioned):

(a) *Al Samoud Factory*. The Al Samoud Factory was one of Iraq's dedicated missile facilities, involved primarily in the manufacture of missile airframes and the production or modification of SA-2 engines for use in the Al Samoud missile. The factory has now been completely razed. Dual-use equipment subject to monitoring remaining at the site included SA-2 missile engines (18), three-axis computer numerical control (CNC) milling machines (7), balancing machines (used in the production of turbopumps) (4), specialized welding equipment (7), vacuum furnaces (3), precision turning equipment (5), a three-dimensional (3D)-measuring machine (1), a hydrostatic test equipment for engine combustion chambers, valves and turbopumps (4), cleaning tanks (5), a flow forming machine (1), a vacuum brazing furnace (1), a vacuum diffusion pump (1) and a spark erosion machine (1);

(b) *Fallujah 2 and 3*. Two sites operated by the Tariq State Company and subject to monitoring in the chemical area, known as Fallujah 2 and Fallujah 3, have been completely emptied and destroyed. The equipment at the site included polyvinyl difluoride-coated tanks (53), graphite or hastalloy heat exchangers (11), glass-lined or rubber-coated tanks and vessels (54), hastalloy or graphite columns (18) and glass-lined reactors (7).

III. Other activities

Compendium

12. Previous quarterly reports have described work on the UNMOVIC compendium of proscribed weapons and programmes. One of the issues under evaluation by UNMOVIC in the framework of the compendium is the examination of information available to it on the past storage, handling and deployment of chemical and biological munitions by Iraq, a summary of which is attached as appendix I. Such an evaluation can assist in the verification and assessment of material balances of such munitions. It may also help in the interpretation of the recent media reports regarding the findings by the coalition forces of a number of chemical munitions in Iraq.

Ongoing monitoring and verification plan

13. Work continues on possible changes to the ongoing monitoring and verification plan approved by Security Council resolution 715 (1991), in the light of experience and changes on the ground in Iraq. One issue currently being examined is the degree of access that would enable UNMOVIC to fulfil the mandate given to it by the Security Council, namely, to operate a system of ongoing monitoring and verification and to verify Iraq's compliance with its unconditional obligations in

paragraph 10 of resolution 687 (1991) not to use, develop, construct or acquire any of the items specified in section C of that resolution.

Assessment of Iraq's remotely piloted and unmanned aerial vehicle programmes

14. In the publicly released testimony of the head of the Iraq Survey Group in March 2004, mention was made of the uncovering of a very robust Iraqi programme for delivery systems that had not been reported to the United Nations. While not much specific detail is provided in the statement by the Survey Group, it is considered important to set out what UNMOVIC knows of Iraq's remotely piloted and unmanned aerial vehicle (RPV/UAV) programmes and their relationship to the delivery of chemical and/or biological warfare agents. A short summary of the Commission's findings on these issues is attached as appendix II, which is a condensed version of a detailed internal UNMOVIC report on its assessment of Iraq's RPV/UAV programmes.

IV. Other issues

Headquarters

15. The UNMOVIC headquarters offices formerly on the 31st floor of the Secretariat building have been relocated to the nearby Alcoa building at 866 United Nations Plaza.

Field offices

16. UNMOVIC continues to retain a core staff of 10 local nationals in Baghdad who maintain the existing offices, laboratories and other equipment there at the Canal Hotel.

17. The Cyprus Field Office continues to store and maintain the UNMOVIC inspection and monitoring equipment recovered from Iraq. A complete inventory of all UNMOVIC property outside Iraq, with photographs and acquisition costs, was completed on 24 June 2004. Loaned equipment, such as four chemical agent monitors, has been returned to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and communications equipment was returned to the United States of America. The Field Office staff have disposed of expiring chemicals and medical supplies as well as outdated equipment from the closing of the Bahrain Field Office. Following the inspection and maintenance of the remote monitoring surveillance equipment, an expert has advised the UNMOVIC Field Office staff on how to maintain the chemical detection equipment and the life-support equipment. Additionally, letters have been sent to the manufacturers of the most sensitive inspection equipment for guidance on maintaining equipment during storage. Whenever appropriate, the staff of the Field Office have provided logistics support to flight operations of the United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq.

Staffing

18. There have been few changes in the staffing levels of UNMOVIC since the last report (S/2004/435). Core UNMOVIC staff in the Professional category at headquarters at present total 50 weapons experts and other personnel drawn from 24 nationalities, 9 of whom are women.

Technical visits, meetings and workshops

19. The Acting Executive Chairman attended the 2004 Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference in Washington, D.C., in June and participated in a panel discussing inspections after Iraq.

20. UNMOVIC experts attended the International Chemical Weapons Demilitarization Conference in the Russian Federation in order to gain insight on new developments in technologies for the detection and destruction of chemical weapons. UNMOVIC experts also attended the Eighth International Symposium on Protection against Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents in Sweden. Decontamination procedures for biological agents and the construction of genotyping databases are examples of areas of technologies that were discussed and are of relevance to UNMOVIC.

21. UNMOVIC experts attended a conference in the United States covering missile and UAV guidance, navigation and control technologies. UNMOVIC experts also attended a training exercise involving the SA-2 missile system in Romania, the objective of which was to improve their knowledge in liquid-propellant missile technology and the SA-2 missile in particular. The training exercise consisted of a presentation of the missile and all its different sub-systems, observation of the preparation for a flight test, attendance at several live firings and analysis of the results.

Training

22. During the reporting period, UNMOVIC continued its training activities. An advanced training course for experts on the UNMOVIC roster was conducted in Argentina from 28 June to 9 July 2004. Seventeen experts from 14 Member States and UNMOVIC staff attended the course, which was devoted to enhancing the trainees' practical inspection skills to be used in monitoring inspections of missile sites. The Commission is grateful to the Government of Argentina for the support it provided in the conduct of the course.

V. College of Commissioners

23. During the reporting period the UNMOVIC College of Commissioners was not convened. However, in accordance with paragraph 5 of resolution 1284 (1999), the Commissioners were consulted on the contents of the present report.

Appendix I

Past storage, handling and deployment of chemical and biological munitions by Iraq

Chemical munitions

Filled munitions

1. The Muthanna State Establishment was the major contractor to the Ministry of Defence, solely responsible for the provision of all chemical munitions to Iraq's armed forces. It was subordinate to the Military Industrialization Commission, which was a part of the Ministry of Industry of Iraq. Prior to 1987, the Muthanna State Establishment was known as the State Establishment for Pesticide Production and was subordinate to the State Organization for Technical Industries, which was the predecessor of the Military Industrialization Commission. Its military code was Project 922.

2. According to Iraq's declarations, interviews with Iraqi officials and documents found in Iraq in the period from 1981 to 1991, the Muthanna State Establishment filled and delivered to the armed forces a total of some 130,000 of various types of chemical munition filled with chemical warfare agents. Those numbers did not include tens of thousands of mortar bombs filled with riot-control agents and smoke munitions also supplied by the Establishment.

3. According to Iraq's declarations, of the 130,000 munitions filled with chemical warfare agents, some 105,000 munitions were supplied to the armed forces during the Iran-Iraq war, in the period from 1981 to 1988, the first large-scale production phase. Of these, some 101,000 deployed munitions filled with about 3,000 tons of chemical warfare agents were used in combat by Iraq during the same period. The remaining 25,000 filled chemical munitions were delivered by the Muthanna State Establishment to the armed forces after the Iran-Iraq war, shortly prior to the 1991 Gulf War. The United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) has no evidence that chemical munitions of any type were filled by Iraq with chemical agents after the adoption of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

4. In the 1980s, the Muthanna State Establishment did not accumulate stocks of chemical munitions beyond the scope of specific orders from the Ministry of Defence. The temporary storage of chemical munitions prior to their shipment by trucks to the armed forces was carried out at reinforced concrete bunkers in the storage area at the Establishment and at dedicated storage areas controlled by it at two conventional ammunition depots, Muhammadiyat and Ukhaider. Chemical munitions were shipped to central and regional conventional ammunition depots and air bases and from there deployed further down to artillery units and air force regiments. After the deployment, the Establishment maintained responsibility for technical inspection and maintenance of chemical munitions in the possession of the armed forces.

5. Iraq did not provide details regarding specific military units involved in the deployment, handling and combat use of chemical munitions. It maintained that such issues were outside the scope of the Commission's verification mandate. However, in its general statements, Iraq acknowledged that regular military units in

theatres of operation involved in the use of conventional munitions were to receive and use chemical weapons if necessary under special directives. This suggested that even if chemical munitions were handled separately from conventional arms at ammunition depots, they could have been inadvertently mixed to a certain extent with conventional weapons at military units.

6. Defective or leaking chemical munitions were routinely recalled and handled by the Muthanna State Establishment. This resulted in the accumulation of hundreds of such filled defective munitions at the Establishment. According to documents found by the Commission in Iraq, some unused chemical munitions were also returned to the Establishment after the end of the Iran-Iraq war in August 1988. However, it remains unknown whether all unused chemical weapons left over after the Iran-Iraq war were collected and returned to the Establishment, since Iraq did not provide sufficient production, deployment, consumption and inventory records for chemical weapons (see S/1999/94).

7. The second large-scale chemical weapon production campaign took place in Iraq from April 1990 to January 1991. During that period, the Muthanna State Establishment produced and supplied the armed forces with some 25,000 chemical munitions referred to above (para. 3). According to Iraq's declarations, the weapons were deployed to 17 ammunition depots, airbases and airfields throughout Iraq. There was no evidence suggesting that they were further distributed to field military units, with the exception of 50 chemical warheads for the Al Hussein missiles deployed to the Technical Battalion of the Surface-to-Surface Missile Corps.

8. Immediately after the 1991 Gulf war, Iraq undertook to collect all chemical munitions delivered to the armed forces at designated areas controlled by the Muthanna State Establishment. Of the 25,000 chemical munitions delivered, over 2,000 were declared by Iraq to have been destroyed by coalition forces during the war. Another 500 munitions were declared to have been destroyed unilaterally by Iraq and some 22,000 munitions destroyed by Iraq under the supervision of United Nations inspectors in accordance with Security Council resolution 687 (1991) in the period from 1991 to 1994. However, during the collection of chemical weapons after the 1991 war, Iraq was not able to locate 500 chemical munitions (see S/1999/356).

9. Later, in 1997, 14 missing munitions filled with the chemical warfare agent mustard were found by UNSCOM having been abandoned at an ammunition depot in Iraq, used in the past as a munitions storage and distribution facility. In 2003, they were destroyed by Iraq under the supervision of United Nations inspectors (see S/2003/580).

10. On another occasion, over 1,000 chemical artillery rockets (of the 2,000 mentioned above) destroyed and damaged by the coalition were buried by Iraq in an open area in 1991. Later, in 1992, around 800 of those munitions were recovered and destroyed by Iraq under the supervision of United Nations inspectors. The recovered rockets were not usable because of poor condition and mechanical damage. However, many of them still contained viable chemical warfare agents. Inspectors continued to unearth additional munitions containing residues of such agents at the burial site up until 1998.

11. In addition to chemical munitions delivered by the Muthanna State Establishment to the armed forces, there were also hundreds of old chemical munitions remaining in its custody, consisting of old weapons left over after the

Iran-Iraq war and defective munitions not suitable for combat use. Most of these munitions were destroyed or damaged by the coalition through the aerial bombardment during the 1991 Gulf war.

12. A bunker at the storage area of the Muthanna State Establishment containing hundreds of artillery rockets filled with nerve agents was destroyed in part through coalition aerial bombardment in 1991. Because of the collapsed roof of the structure it was not possible to determine the exact extent of the destruction of munitions, nor their exact quantity (Iraq claimed that there were 2,500 munitions in the bunker). In order to prevent further contamination of the area with nerve agents from damaged rockets, Iraq, under the supervision of United Nations inspectors, sealed the structure with reinforced concrete and brick walls covered with earth. In 1994, Iraq signed a protocol with the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) by which it undertook to inspect the sealed bunker at least once a month to ensure that the seals were intact and the warning signs were not removed, damaged or defaced. Iraq also agreed to seek the approval of the United Nations inspectors prior to opening or entering the bunker as long as Security Council resolution 715 (1991) remained in force. There were also 16 other sealed structures and areas at the Muthanna State Establishment that contained potentially hazardous items and materials covered by the same protocol. UNMOVIC does not know whether these procedures have been followed up by the coalition forces after the withdrawal of UNMOVIC from Iraq in March 2003 or recently pursued by the Interim Government of Iraq.

Empty munitions

13. According to Iraq's declarations, in addition to munitions filled with chemical agents, there were 98,000 munitions acquired or produced by Iraq for chemical weapons purposes that remained unfilled up until 1991. Those empty munitions were kept at multiple storage areas in the vicinity of the Muthanna State Establishment under its custody and at several other military ammunition depots and some munitions production facilities in Iraq where they had been manufactured. Of the 98,000 munitions, 36,500 were claimed by Iraq to have been destroyed by the coalition through aerial bombardment during the 1991 war, 29,000 were declared to have been destroyed unilaterally by Iraq in the summer of 1991, 15,500 were converted by Iraq to conventional munitions by filling them with high explosives in 1995 and some 17,000 munitions were declared and destroyed by Iraq under the supervision of United Nations inspectors in the period from 1991 to 1994.

14. However, given the lack of physical evidence to support Iraq's declarations on the destruction of unfilled munitions by aerial bombardment and unilateral destruction, it was not possible to finalize their coherent numerical accounting (see S/1999/94). Thus, it was not surprising that, in the course of its inspections in Iraq in 2003, UNMOVIC found 18 unfilled chemical rockets at ammunition depots involved in the handling of similar weapons in the past. These were designated for destruction by UNMOVIC but the destruction did not take place owing to the withdrawal of UNMOVIC from Iraq in March 2003 (see S/2003/580).

Munitions prototypes

15. In addition, in the period from 1981 to 1991, the Muthanna State Establishment used some 1,000 other prototypes of chemical munitions for static and dynamic tests. Those tests were carried out in remote areas in the desert. Munitions for trials were filled with both chemical warfare agents and simulants. One such munition, a 155-mm binary artillery projectile, was referred to in the seventeenth UNMOVIC quarterly report (S/2004/435).

Observations

16. In general, given the large total quantities of chemical munitions produced and filled by Iraq with chemical warfare agents over the period of 10 years, several deployment and recollection campaigns, the dozens of facilities and units involved in the handling of those weapons and the existing gaps in the accounting for the munitions, it is not surprising that some munitions have been found by the coalition forces.

17. UNMOVIC has no specific details to ascertain conditions of the munitions found by the coalition forces. Depending on the munition model, types of chemical warfare agent, dates of their production and filling, storage conditions, some old Iraqi munitions could still retain high-purity chemical warfare agents, while others would contain degraded chemical warfare agents, binary components or only their residues.

Biological munitions

18. According to Iraq's declarations, interviews with Iraqi officials and documents supplied by Iraq, the number of biological munitions produced in a short period of time (1990-1991) were limited, if compared with the tens of thousands of chemical munitions delivered to the armed forces in the period of 10 years. Iraq declared that a total of 182 munitions (157 aerial bombs and 25 missile warheads) were filled with biological warfare agents by the Muthanna State Establishment from December 1990 to January 1991. However, owing to insufficient documentation for the filling of munitions with biological warfare agents, it was not possible to fully verify Iraq's statements regarding the total numbers of munitions filled with such agents.

19. In early 1991, missile warheads filled with biological warfare agents were deployed to the Technical Battalion of the Surface-to-Surface Missile Corps, where a test was performed to check their integration with missile airframes later stored at two locations. Biological bombs were dispatched to two other remote locations but, according to Iraq, remained under the control of the Technical Research Centre, Iraq's main biological warfare production and research organization.

20. In 1995, all filled biological munitions were declared by Iraq to have been destroyed unilaterally in the summer of 1991 at two remote locations. UNSCOM was able to confirm the destruction of some 25 missile warheads at one location through the evaluation of the excavated missile fragments and some biological forensic analysis of the fragments.

21. Iraq declared that the unilateral destruction of filled aerial bombs had taken place at one location, the Al Azzizziyah firing range. In February-March 2003, to minimize the gap in the verification of Iraq's unilateral destruction, Iraq undertook further efforts to recover additional evidence of the destruction of biological bombs.

As at March 2003, different parts accounting for a total of 104 bombs, including 8 intact munitions, were unearthed by Iraq at the location of their unilateral destruction. Together with 24 bombs recovered earlier by UNSCOM, this made a total of 128 bombs out of 157 declared by Iraq (see S/2003/580). Since the ongoing excavation was interrupted after the withdrawal of UNMOVIC from Iraq, it is possible that more munitions and their parts and fragments could remain at the site. Any biological warfare agent found in such munitions would be inactive: sampling and analysis of excavated munitions carried out in 1997 and 2003 found no live agent.

Appendix II

Assessment of Iraq's remotely piloted and unmanned aerial vehicles programmes

Introduction

1. One of the priorities of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) for investigation and inspection has been Iraq's programme for remotely piloted and unmanned aerial vehicles (RPV/UAVs). Under the Security Council resolutions, Iraq is prohibited from developing and producing ballistic missiles capable of exceeding a range of 150 kilometres (km). A revision of the annexes to the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification in 1995 expanded the prohibitions applicable to ballistic missiles to include drones and other RPV/UAV systems. Of concern to United Nations inspection teams in the 1990s was the association between the organizations that managed and supported the RPV/UAV programme and those formerly involved in its proscribed chemical and biological warfare programmes. The production and testing of ballistic missiles and RPV/UAVs were subject to reinforced ongoing monitoring and verification by UNMOVIC under Security Council resolution 1284 (1999).

MiG-21 remotely piloted vehicle and Mirage spray tank

2. In its June 1996 "Full, Final and Complete Disclosure" of biological weapons, Iraq declared a 1990 project to investigate the modification of a MiG-21 fighter aircraft into an RPV for the dissemination of biological warfare agents using a Mirage F-1 drop tank modified to spray liquid agents. The declaration revealed past efforts to link an RPV programme with spray devices to disseminate biological warfare agents. When interviewed, Iraqi personnel indicated that there were in fact two separate projects associated with modified external fuel tanks: a manned Mirage F-1 and a MiG-21 RPV.

3. In a letter to UNMOVIC dated 19 March 2003, Iraq provided more details of the MiG-21 aircraft involved in the project, such as engine number, tail number, squadron and location. This submission of information was provided after UNMOVIC teams had been withdrawn from Iraq and therefore no verification was possible.

Al Bai'aa L-29 RPV project

4. In June 1997, Iraq declared that it had started a project called "Al Bai'aa" in November 1995, involving the conversion of 12 L-29 training aircraft into RPVs for air defence training. Documents obtained during an inspection refer to unmanned aircraft for use as air targets.

5. According to Iraq's declarations, the Al Bai'aa L-29 RPV was designed to fly to a range of about 80 km, which was determined by the effective limits of the remote control station on the ground. United Nations inspection teams found no clear indication to show that Iraq had planned to develop the L-29 RPV to deliver a chemical or biological warfare agent. UNMOVIC inspections in 2003 found that, although documentation indicated that at least one Al Bai'aa L-29 aircraft remained operational as at May 2001, the Al Bai'aa project appeared to have ceased in late 2001.

Smaller RPV/UAV programmes

6. Iraq commenced production of smaller-sized RPVs in the late 1980s, including the Saker, Sharab and Shaheen systems. The Technical Research Centre, which was involved in payload design for some of the smaller RPVs, was also responsible for a number of both proscribed (including research, development and bulk production of biological warfare agents after 1987) and intelligence-related projects. Despite these early connections between the Centre and the RPV programme, there is no evidence available to UNMOVIC to show that the earlier RPVs were actually, or intended to be, configured to disperse chemical or biological warfare agents.

7. Iraq declared to UNMOVIC that it had started a new project called the "RPV-20" in May 1999, aimed at the "design and construction of a programmable drone with a flight range of 100 km and an endurance of one hour". Other projects commenced after 2000, including the "RPV-30" and two experimental RPVs. The RPV-20 was the only new smaller RPV/UAV in series production and was tested several times using its onboard global positioning system (GPS) to fly circuits. In addition, Iraq had declared the continued production of other types of smaller RPV/UAV, which had started in the mid-1990s, including the Yamama series used for air defence training and reconnaissance (see the table below).

Some of Iraq's small remotely piloted and unmanned aerial vehicles

Data	*Full length (m)*	*Wingspan (m)*	*Pay load (kg)*	*Fuel tank (litres)*	*Speed (km/h)*	*Flight range (km)*	*Engine*[a]
RPV-20	3.60[b]	4.80	20	12	165	124	22 or 26 horsepower (hp)
RPV-30 (model 2)	4.70	4.77	30	-	-	-	Rotary 32 hp
RPV-20A(Q8)	3.10	4.80	20	10-12	108	-	9 hp/100 cubic centimetres (cc)
RPV-30A	4.16	7.45	30	20-23	110	55	(front) 8-9 hp/100cc (rear) 12 hp/150 cc
Yamama-4	3.15	4.2	-	-	-	-	18 hp/200 cc
Yamama-11	1.89	2.45[b]	-	1[b]	140	-	35 cc
Yamama-12	2.34	2.46	-	3.75	70-130	-	70 cc
Yamama-13	2.46	3.2	-	6	220	-	272 cc

Note. A dash indicates unknown or data not provided.

[a] Piston engines except where stated.

[b] Approximate.

8. UNMOVIC had concerns that the RPV-20 could have the potential to exceed 150 km. There were also concerns that the RPV-20 could have been considered by Iraq as a delivery platform for biological warfare agents. UNMOVIC has analysed the theoretical possibilities of the flight range of the RPV-20 on the basis of the information collected on RPV/UAVs during inspections and that provided by Iraq in its declarations and explanatory letters. From an aeronautical engineering viewpoint, the RPV-20 could have been capable of a range in excess of 150 km with certain modifications. Iraq declared that one flight test of the RPV-20 had achieved a range

of 124 km. If, for example, the parachute bay were to be replaced by an additional 12-litre fuel tank, this might double the range of the RPV (to more than 250 km). While theoretically and even practically possible, UNMOVIC has no evidence from documentation or interviews that such modifications were actually accomplished or planned. Additionally, none of the RPV-20s seen by UNMOVIC varied from the original diagrammatic models presented by Iraq.

9. While extending the range may have represented a relatively affordable technical task, equipping the smaller UAVs to efficiently deliver a biological agent would have been a much more complicated undertaking. It could have been technically possible to place a limited quantity of a biological warfare agent on a small RPV platform; however, it would be more problematic to develop an efficient device for the effective dissemination of such small amounts of liquid agent (there is no evidence available to UNMOVIC that Iraq ever mastered the technology to produce dry agents). In addition, there was no indication from inspections or Iraqi documentation available to UNMOVIC that Iraq actually undertook to change the original internal configuration of small RPVs.

10. Although inspections confirmed much of what was declared by Iraq, UNMOVIC did find some discrepancies in Iraq's declarations. Following the discovery by inspectors of a 7.45-metre (m) wingspan RPV-30A at Samarra East airfield on 10 February 2003, and confirmed on 17 February, Iraq provided a letter to UNMOVIC on 18 February 2003 stating that a typing error had occurred in the preparation of their relevant declaration and that the declared wingspan was not 4.40 m, but 7.40 m. In addition, inspections discovered an undeclared RPV/UAV similar to the RPV-20. Iraq stated that this was the Yamama-4 and later included it in its letter of 19 March 2003, along with details of other RPV/UAVs (a radar decoy and a cruise missile model). During site inspections, UNMOVIC noticed some RPVs that appeared incomplete or looked still at the test stage.

Summary and conclusions

11. According to Iraq, its RPV programme commenced in the late 1980s. Local production and assembly of a range of small RPVs followed familiarization with basic RPV technology. Those RPVs incorporated foreign designs and imported components and were declared to have been used for air defence training and surveillance. In addition, Iraq also modified obsolete military jet aircraft. The MiG-21 conversion project showed some promise before being halted by the first Gulf war, while the Al Bai'aa L-29 RPV project ceased after several years of development and trials.

12. The small RPV/UAVs were a continuation of earlier programmes and probably reflect Iraqi interest in keeping some production assets employed and keeping abreast with RPV/UAV technology. Iraq had experimented with airframe and design changes for the small RPV/UAVs from 1999 until March 2003 within its limited resources and technical constraints. The information available to UNMOVIC so far suggests that the concept of these RPV/UAVs was for conventional military purposes such as air defence training, data collection and surveillance.

13. UNMOVIC found no technical evidence that Iraq had achieved prohibited ranges or of the development of RPV/UAV systems for the delivery of chemical and biological warfare agents.

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Original: French

Letter dated 26 August 2004 from the Permanent Representative of Burundi to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you the declaration on the killings of Congolese refugees at the Gatumba camp adopted by the Fourteenth Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Durban, South Africa, on 19 August 2004 (see annex).

The Conference condemned the heinous killings for which the PALIPEHUTU-FNL has proudly claimed responsibility. It supported the decision taken by the Regional Summit on Burundi held on 18 August 2004 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, to declare the PALIPEHUTU-FNL Movement a terrorist organization, and urged the United Nations and the African Union to reinforce that stand according to the relevant instruments.

The Government of Burundi also hopes that the Council will regard the PALIPEHUTU-FNL Movement as having lost its credibility as a partner in the peace process, owing to its refusal to stop the violence and to respond to the repeated appeals to join the peace process.

I should appreciate it if you could arrange to have this letter and its annex circulated as a Security Council document.

(*Signed*) Marc **Nteturuye**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 26 August 2004 from the Permanent Representative of Burundi to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]

Declaration on the Gatumba massacre adopted by the Fourteenth Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement

The Ministers attending the XIV Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement:

Reaffirming the NAM's determination to preserve the noble ideals and principles of the Movement as well as the principles set forth in the United Nations Charter,

Stressing the importance of the maintenance of international peace and security and the respect for international law,

1. Condemn in the strongest terms the heinous killing of the Congolese refugees of the Gatumba camp in Burundi which occurred on 13 August 2004.

2. Express their sympathy and support to the families of the victims, and wishes quick recovery to the injured.

3. Support the resolve of the Heads of State of the 22nd Summit of the Great Lakes Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi held on 18 August 2004 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, to declare the PALIPEHUTU-FNL Movement which claimed the responsibility for the massacre, a terrorist organization, and urge the United Nations and the African Union to take appropriate measures to reinforce this stand according to the relevant instruments.

4. Support also the proposal to conduct an International Investigation to establish the facts in order to bring to justice those responsible and take any other political action deemed necessary.

5. Extend their solidarity with countries and people of the African Great Lakes region and appeal to their leaders and governments to work together and timelessly for the peace, the stability and sustainable development of the region.

United Nations S/2004/695

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 August 2004

Original: English

Letter dated 24 August 2004 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP).

Major-General Pertti Puonti (Finland), who has been the Chief Military Observer of UNMOGIP since 9 January 2002, relinquished his post on 28 July 2004. Following the usual consultations, it is my intention to appoint Major-General Guido Palmieri (Italy) as the next Chief Military Observer of UNMOGIP.

(*Signed*) Kofi **Annan**

04-47203 (E) 270804

United Nations S/2004/696

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 August 2004

Original: English

Letter dated 27 August 2004 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 24 August 2004 concerning your intention to appoint Major-General Guido Palmieri (Italy) as the Chief Military Observer of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the intention expressed in your letter.

(*Signed*) Andrey I. **Denisov**
President of the Security Council

04-47197 (E) 270804

United Nations S/2004/697

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 August 2004

Original: English

Second report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1528 (2004) of 27 February 2004, by which the Council requested me to report to it every three months on the situation in Côte d'Ivoire, the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement and the implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (ONUCI). This report covers major developments since my report of 2 June 2004 (S/2004/443).

II. Developments in the peace process

2. During the reporting period, the Ivorian peace process continued to face serious difficulties. Commitments made by the Ivorian parties to move forward on implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement have however given rise to cautious optimism.

3. It will be recalled that a political impasse began early in March, following the decision of a coalition of opposition parties to suspend their participation in the Government of National Reconciliation in protest against what they perceived as the slow pace of implementation of the reforms envisaged under the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. As the impasse continued into June and the early part of July, it was exacerbated by a deteriorating security situation. On several occasions, disruptive youth groups carried out violent attacks against French troops (Licorne force) and United Nations personnel and property. On 5 June, some 500 "young patriots" staged a violent demonstration outside the French military base in Abidjan, demanding that the Licorne force either disarm the Forces nouvelles or leave the country. On 6 June, a group of about 30 "uncontrolled elements" of the Forces nouvelles attacked the positions of the Forces armées nationales de Côte d'Ivoire (FANCI) at Gohitafla, located in the centre-west of the country. The FANCI and Licorne forces repelled the attack, which resulted in some 20 deaths, mainly of civilians. In retaliation, FANCI reportedly used helicopters to attack some positions in Forces nouvelles-controlled areas in the north, resulting in a number of injuries. The Forces nouvelles denied any involvement in the attack and alleged that it had been mounted as part of the campaign to discredit it and justify military action by FANCI. In the aftermath, both FANCI and Forces nouvelles increased their level of

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alert and reinforced their positions along the zone of confidence. On 10 June, FANCI established a checkpoint inside the zone of confidence, north of Kotouba.

4. On 7 June, as the President, Laurent Gbagbo, left Côte d'Ivoire for a private visit to the United States of America, a group of "young patriots" held a violent demonstration outside the French Embassy in Abidjan. They later proceeded to randomly attack Licorne and United Nations vehicles. The national police eventually intervened to disperse them, but one ONUCI military observer sustained minor injuries. Demonstrations by "young patriots" were also reported on 7 July in San-Pédro, where two ONUCI military observers came under attack but were not injured. Altogether, some 30 ONUCI vehicles in Abidjan and San-Pédro were damaged. Demonstrations against ONUCI and French targets by the "young patriots" continued in several towns, including Abidjan, Port Bouet and Yamoussoukro, for a number of days thereafter. The protestors accused the international community of complicity in the earlier incident at Gohitafla.

5. Several initiatives were taken by international stakeholders to defuse the tensions and to advance the peace process. The Monitoring Committee established under the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement issued a communiqué on 7 June, in which it expressed its serious concern at the recent upsurge in violence in Côte d'Ivoire, condemned the attack perpetrated at Gohitafla and recommended that action be taken to identify those responsible. Early in June, my Special Representative, Albert Tévoédjrè, had extensive consultations with President Gbagbo, the Prime Minister, Seydou Diarra, the Speaker of the National Assembly, and the leaders of Ivorian political parties on ways to overcome the impasse in the peace process.

6. Meanwhile, in a parallel effort to resume dialogue among the Ivorian political forces, the Prime Minister engaged in consultations with the coalition of opposition parties known as the "Coalition des Marcoussistes". On 20 June, the President of Ghana, John Agyekum Kufuor, the President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, the President of Togo, Gnassingbe Eyadema, and the Executive Secretary of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Mohamed Ibn Chambas, met with President Gbagbo in Abuja, at an ECOWAS mini-summit at which strategies to put the Ivorian peace process back on track were discussed. The mini-summit focused on the need to restore the integrity of the Government of National Reconciliation, following President Gbagbo's decision to dismiss three opposition Ministers on 18 May, including the Secretary-General of the Forces nouvelles, Guillaume Soro, and to resume dialogue between the President and the opposition.

7. In a televised speech on 21 June, President Gbagbo announced that, following the mini-summit, he was determined to remove all obstacles to the Ivorian peace process. He also condemned all attacks against French citizens and United Nations personnel, whom he described as "allies in the peace process". While reiterating his support to the Prime Minister, the President encouraged the Government to submit without delay all remaining draft laws envisaged under the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement to the National Assembly for adoption. He concluded by pointing to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, the reunification of the country and the elections to be held in October 2005 as the three main priorities for restoring peace and normalcy in Côte d'Ivoire.

8. These national and subregional initiatives were reinforced by the Security Council mission to West Africa, which visited Abidjan on 23 and 24 June. The mission reiterated to the Ivorian parties the concerns of the international community

about the political impasse, the paralysis of the Government of National Reconciliation and the lack of overall security in the country. In addition, it urged the President and the Prime Minister to consult with all parties signatory to the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement with a view to restoring the integrity of the Government and resuming its activities, to agree on a timetable for the implementation of the Agreement and to ensure the adoption of all the envisaged legal reforms by the National Assembly by 28 July. The mission also called on the Ivorian parties to demonstrate genuine political will and leadership in fulfilling their obligations under the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. The mission emphasized that the Agreement remained the only framework for the country's return to normalcy and that the Security Council would consider appropriate, targeted measures against individuals who obstructed its implementation.

9. On 25 June, the President of Gabon, Omar Bongo Ondimba, met President Gbagbo in Libreville to explore ways of resuming dialogue among all Ivorian political forces, reviving the activities of the Government of National Reconciliation and other steps to overcome the political impasse and, in particular, prepare for open and transparent presidential elections in October 2005. Early in July, President Bongo met with the major Ivorian political forces, including representatives of the Coalition des Marcoussistes, with the participation of the leader of the Rally of the Republicans, Alassane Ouattara; the Forces nouvelles; and President Gbagbo's political party, the Ivorian Patriotic Front.

10. On 29 and 30 June, President Gbagbo met with the Coalition des Marcoussistes in Abidjan, in the presence of the Prime Minister, in an attempt to resume the political dialogue. The agenda included the return of the three dismissed Ministers to the Government of National Reconciliation and the delegation of powers from the President to the Prime Minister. The Forces nouvelles did not participate in the meeting, although their spokesperson, Sidiki Konate, had previously indicated that the movement would stand by any agreement reached there by the other members of the Coalition des Marcoussistes.

11. These mediation efforts helped to set the stage for the holding of a mini-summit on Côte d'Ivoire, which I convened on 6 July in Addis Ababa, on the sidelines of the third African Union summit. The meeting was attended by the Presidents of Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Mali and Nigeria, as well as the Prime Minister of Togo and the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS. The meeting called on the Ivorian parties to increase their efforts to overcome the political impasse; restore the integrity of, and confidence in, the Government of National Reconciliation; and proceed with the dismantling of all paramilitary and militia groups. President Gbagbo and Prime Minister Diarra were called upon to take action to resume the effective functioning of the Government of National Reconciliation, and the Government was urged to address all remaining legal reforms envisaged under the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement without further delay. The Ivorian parties were urged to establish security conditions necessary for the resumption of State administration and normal economic activities nationwide, as well as for the organization of the elections in October 2005. The meeting also appealed to the concerned Ivorian parties to participate in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process without further delay or pre-conditions.

12. It was also decided that a high-level meeting of all the Ivorian political forces, including the President and the Prime Minister, would be convened in Accra on

29 July, to give impetus to the peace process. It was also agreed that the following confidence-building measures would be taken prior to the Accra meeting: President Gbagbo would meet with the leaders of all Ivorian political forces; the National Assembly would adopt all legal reforms envisaged under the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement before the end of July; the Joint Côte d'Ivoire-Mali and Côte d'Ivoire-Burkina Faso Commissions would be reactivated; and the Heads of State of Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire and Mali would hold a tripartite meeting to prepare the ground for the success of the Accra summit.

13. Accordingly, the Joint Côte d'Ivoire-Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire-Mali Commissions met from 15 to 17 July in Abidjan and from 23 to 25 July in Bamako, respectively. The tripartite summit of the Heads of State of Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire and Mali was held on 27 July in Bamako. President Gbagbo also met with the leaders of some Ivorian political forces. Following extensive deliberations, the National Assembly unanimously adopted amendments to the law of land tenure. It did not however reach agreement on amendments to the nationality code and the membership of the Independent Electoral Commission before the conclusion of its ordinary session on 28 July.

The Accra III high-level meeting

14. The high-level meeting on Côte d'Ivoire was held in Accra on 29 and 30 July 2004 and brought together 13 African Heads of State, including President Kufuor of Ghana, in his capacity as Chairperson of ECOWAS, and President Obasanjo of Nigeria, in his capacity as Chairperson of the African Union. The meeting, which I chaired jointly with President Kufuor, was also attended by the Prime Minister of Angola, senior representatives of three other African countries, the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission. President Gbagbo and Prime Minister Diarra, and most of the leaders of the 10 Ivorian political forces signatory to the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, also participated in the meeting.

15. After two days of intense discussions, the parties reached a consensus on how to address the key outstanding issues facing the peace process, and signed the Accra III Agreement, which provides a framework and a timetable for the reactivation of the peace process with a view to ensuring the full implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. With regard to the controversial issue of the revision of article 35 concerning eligibility to the presidency, the parties agreed that President Gbagbo should use the powers conferred upon him by the Constitution to implement, by the end of September, the provisions regarding this matter in the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. In addition, the parties agreed that the extraordinary session of the National Assembly, convened by President Gbagbo on 28 July, should proceed with the adoption, by the end of August, of all legal reforms envisaged under the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement.

16. The parties committed themselves to the commencement of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process by 15 October, by which date the key legal reforms envisaged under the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement should be adopted and the necessary technical preparations for the process completed. They also agreed that the process should include all paramilitary and militia groups.

17. In addition, the parties agreed on the need for a clear delegation of powers from the President to the Prime Minister. President Gbagbo thus undertook to issue

a decree, which would specify the areas covered by the delegation of powers, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, and to implement adequate additional measures in this regard. Agreement was also reached on the urgent need to resume the work of the Government of National Reconciliation, in order to ensure the implementation of the Agreement and the country's progressive return to normalcy. In addition, the parties agreed that a meeting of the Council of Ministers would be convened within a week of the signing of the Accra III Agreement.

18. The parties committed themselves to cooperating fully with the International Commission of Inquiry, established by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, in accordance with the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, to investigate the human rights violations perpetrated in Côte d'Ivoire since the beginning of the crisis on 19 September 2002. They also agreed on the urgent need to establish the National Human Rights Commission, also provided for in the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. Finally, the parties agreed to establish a tripartite monitoring group, comprising the representatives in Côte d'Ivoire of ECOWAS, the African Union and ONUCI. The monitoring group was requested to submit fortnightly reports on progress in the implementation of the Accra III Agreement to the Chairperson of ECOWAS, the Chairperson of the African Union, and to myself.

19. A number of steps have been taken towards the implementation of the Accra III Agreement. On 9 August, President Gbagbo issued two presidential decrees: the first restored the three previously dismissed opposition Ministers to their functions within the Government of National Reconciliation, while the second delegated powers from the President to the Prime Minister, to enable the latter to implement relevant provisions of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. On the same day, a full Council of Ministers meeting was held attended by the three reinstated Ministers, including the Secretary-General of the Force nouvelles. ONUCI facilitated the travel of the Forces nouvelles Ministers from Bouaké to Abidjan to attend the meeting. A second meeting of the Council of Ministers was held on 12 August. On 11 August, an extraordinary session of the National Assembly began to consider draft legislation envisaged under the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement.

20. Meanwhile, the tripartite Monitoring Group began its activities chaired by the Special Representative of the ECOWAS Executive Secretary in Abidjan. I have transmitted to the Council the first report received from the Monitoring Group (see S/2004/667), in which the actions taken by the parties to fulfil their obligations and commitments under the Agreement are presented. In the meantime, the Monitoring Committee established under the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement and chaired by my Special Representative continues to follow progress in the overall peace process, thus complementing the work of the Monitoring Group. During the reporting period, the Monitoring Committee intensified its efforts to resume dialogue between the parties and continued to play an important role in urging all the Ivorian parties to adhere to the commitments made under the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement.

III. Deployment of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire and the security situation

21. As at 20 August, the troop strength of ONUCI stood at 5,877, out of a total authorized strength of 6,240 military personnel. With the expected deployment of an engineer company from Pakistan by the end of August, the only outstanding deployment will be an aviation unit, for which consultations with a troop-contributing country are under way.

22. An integrated mission training centre has been established at the force headquarters in Abidjan, for the induction of all military staff. A situation centre and a joint operations centre have also been set up at force headquarters, while the establishment of communication links with both sector headquarters, East (Bouaké) and West (Daloa), is under way.

23. The force headquarters continues to operate from its temporary location in Abidjan at the Hotel Pergola, while awaiting the completion of the refurbishment of the future integrated mission headquarters. Within the country, the deployment of the former ECOMICI re-hatted contingents and an infantry battalion from Morocco to Sector East is close to completion. However, Sector East headquarters continues to be stationed in Zambakro, while its final premises in Bouaké are being completed. Meanwhile, Sector West headquarters is fully operational in Daloa. Deployment to Sector West was completed, following the arrival of the remaining two infantry battalions and an engineer company from Bangladesh. Deployment to the south also continued, with troops operational in San-Pédro and Tabou. A total of 153 military observers (out of 200) have deployed to the mission area, and have commenced operations in Korhogo, Danané, Séguéla, Odienné, Bouna, Man and Ferkessédougou, while their deployment to Abengourou and Gagnoa is under way.

24. The force's activities have focused on patrolling, including border patrolling and guard duties, as well as regular meetings and continuous liaison with FANCI, the military elements of the Forces nouvelles and the Licorne force. The force is also closely coordinating with humanitarian and development agencies to facilitate the delivery of assistance.

25. There has been significant progress in the deployment of the ONUCI civilian police component, which now includes 160 officers, out of an authorized strength of 350. Outside of Abidjan, police advisers are now deployed in San-Pédro, Yamoussoukro and Man, as well as to Sector headquarters in Daloa and Bouaké. ONUCI civilian police officers also assist in the mixed brigade in Bangolo, which includes gendarmes from the Ivorian internal security forces and Forces nouvelles elements, in training and mentoring, and facilitating cooperation between the two sides. In Sector West, a mixed committee, comprising personnel from the Gendarmerie, the Ivorian national police and the ONUCI civilian police component, has been established, to assist in the formulation of policing priorities. Similar committees are in the process of being established in all Gendarmerie and national police locations in Sector West.

26. The ONUCI civilian police component has developed training modules for courses in the maintenance of public law and order, community policing and the investigation of major crimes, including money-laundering. Specific training courses for Ivorian internal security services are also being developed in the field of human rights, in collaboration with the mission's human rights section. In addition,

a "training of trainers" course in close protection will be conducted early in September 2004 for 10 officers from the Ivorian national police and 10 gendarmes who will be trained together. Training initiatives in the north are being closely coordinated with progress in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, with a view to establishing adequate security conditions for the protection of civilians during the disarmament of the armed elements of the Forces nouvelles.

Security situation

27. The deployment of ONUCI has had a generally positive impact on the security situation in the country, which has continued to become more stable during the reporting period. However, a number of violent incidents have occurred, involving, primarily, rival factions of the Forces nouvelles in the north and various youth groups in Abidjan and militias in other parts of the country. These have led to an increased level of tension on both sides of the zone of confidence. In addition, the presence of mercenaries has been reported in both northern and southern areas of the country.

28. In the north, "unidentified" heavily armed elements, allegedly supporters of Staff Sergeant Ibrahim Coulibaly, launched an attack against the military elements of the Forces nouvelles stationed in the Korhogo area on 20 June. The incident resulted in 11 deaths and several injuries among the civilian population. The same armed elements then attacked the convoy of the Secretary-General of the Forces nouvelles, Guillaume Soro, who was returning to Bouaké from Korhogo; there were reportedly no injuries in the attack. On the same day, the head of the military elements of the Forces nouvelles issued a communiqué stating that the attackers had received support from President Gbagbo and the President of Guinea, Lansana Conté, and that additional security measures had been put in place to protect the population in areas suspected to be the target of future attacks. On 21 June, clashes between the rival factions of Soro and Coulibaly in Bouaké resulted in a series of summary executions, including that of a military commander close to Coulibaly. On 25 and 26 June, sporadic shooting between rival factions of the Forces nouvelles was again reported in Korhogo. Mass graves discovered since then in Korhogo have been the object of a ONUCI-led investigation.

29. In Abidjan, on 23 June, about 100 "young patriots" staged a hostile demonstration in front of the Hotel Tiama, at the time of a meeting between the visiting Security Council mission to West Africa and the Coalition des Marcoussistes. A United Nations vehicle was damaged during the demonstration. The following day, another group of "young patriots" stormed the chamber of the National Assembly, which was debating the draft law on the Independent Electoral Commission, to protest against the representation of the Forces nouvelles on the Commission.

30. The situation in Abidjan is currently calm, albeit tense. A strong presence of FANCI and Ivorian security forces has been maintaining overall security, but numerous paramilitary and youth groups continue to operate in the capital. In addition, a large number of checkpoints have been established, where incidents of extortion are increasingly reported.

31. Following the incident of 6 June at Gohitafla, FANCI reinforced their positions along the southern edge of the zone of confidence, in order to track possible infiltration by armed elements from the north. The western areas, primarily

to the west and north-west of Guiglo, remain the most volatile, however, owing in part to a large presence of Liberian and Burkinabé refugees. FANCI support to militias and their involvement in illegal activities have been widely reported in this region.

32. On 25 June, a FANCI soldier opened fire on a Licorne patrol near Yamoussoukro, resulting in the death of a Licorne soldier. The incident was considered to be an isolated event and there was no exchange of fire between FANCI and the Licorne patrol. However, tensions have been rising between local military forces in both the north and south and the impartial forces, especially the Licorne force. Both Forces nouvelles and FANCI elements have continued to impose limitations on the freedom of movement of the impartial forces.

33. A positive development was the resumption on 16 August of the Quadripartite Commission meetings of FANCI, the military elements of the Forces nouvelles, the Licorne force and ONUCI. The meetings focused on the reduction of checkpoints throughout the country, modalities for the withdrawal of heavy weapons and the cantonment of troops and preparations for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme.

IV. Regional aspects

34. ONUCI continues to collaborate with other peacekeeping operations and missions in West Africa to address inter-mission cooperation and cross-border issues. Efforts are under way to further develop joint patrolling of borders and improved lines of communication, in particular with the United Nations Mission in Liberia. Other cross-cutting issues are under consideration between the missions and will form the basis for recommendations to the Security Council in a report which will be submitted later this year.

V. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme

35. Under the Accra III Agreement, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process is to start on 15 October. In preparation, the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration has updated its road map, which is based on the previously-developed joint plan of operations and covers six main areas. These are preliminary operations; awareness-raising; regrouping of forces; disarmament; demobilization; and reintegration. In view of the expanded presence of ONUCI forces, it is now planned to conduct the disarmament and demobilization process in two phases, starting in the north and then proceeding to the south, to be completed by 31 December. The National Commission has also intensified its work to rehabilitate the disarmament sites. A meeting of national stakeholders and international partners held on 13 August was useful for enhancing coordination.

36. The resumption after a five-month interruption of the meetings of the Quadripartite Commission is also a positive development with regard to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration issues. It is worth noting that the Ivorian parties at the meetings did not set any preconditions for the commencement of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. Significant challenges

remain, however, including the formulation of plans to dismantle militias and paramilitary groups, and obtaining funding for the reintegration phase of the programme. The World Bank, which was to contribute to reintegration, suspended disbursements to Côte d'Ivoire, owing to non-payment of debt obligations. In the light of the conclusion of the Accra III Agreement, the World Bank is currently exploring ways to support the peace process. The Government, with support from Japan, the European Union, UNDP and other partners is expected to cover the costs of the disarmament and demobilization phases of the programme.

VI. Human rights

37. During the period under review, the human rights situation in Côte d'Ivoire has continued to be of serious concern. Grave human rights violations have occurred in the north, following inter-factional fighting within the Forces nouvelles. In the Government-controlled area, the situation has been marked by reports of ethnic tensions, including instances of harassment and intimidation of foreigners and civilians from the northern parts of the country by paramilitary and militia groups as well as other disruptive youth groups.

38. The clashes on 20 and 21 June between rival factions of the Forces nouvelles in Bouaké and Korhogo led to increased insecurity in northern areas. Following the attacks, Forces nouvelles elements reportedly conducted numerous house raids and arrests. Summary executions, as well as several instances of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, persecution and involuntary disappearances, have also been reported. A ONUCI fact-finding mission which was dispatched into the area confirmed the existence of three mass graves containing at least 99 bodies of persons killed by gunshots or through suffocation. The ONUCI report has been submitted to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the International Commission of Inquiry for review prior to publication. A number of individuals are still being detained by the Forces nouvelles in relation to these events. ONUCI is in contact with the Forces nouvelles regarding the conditions of their detention and is seeking their liberation.

39. On 22 June, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights established the International Commission of Inquiry envisaged under the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement to investigate all serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law perpetrated in Côte d'Ivoire since 19 September 2002. The Commission arrived in the country on 15 July 2004 and has since met with various Ivorian authorities, including the President and key opposition figures. It has undertaken investigations throughout Côte d'Ivoire and also intends to visit Burkina Faso, Mali and Liberia. ONUCI, in collaboration with UNDP and other United Nations agencies, is providing administrative and logistic support to the Commission.

40. An increase in violence coupled with impunity has also been reported in Government-controlled areas. No judicial inquiry has been undertaken to identify and bring to justice the perpetrators of the violent attacks early in June against the French Embassy, the United Nations and other international personnel in Abidjan and, later in the month, against the members of the National Assembly during a debate on the draft law on the Independent Electoral Commission.

41. In the western part of the country, the human rights situation is mainly dominated by intercommunal conflict. Land ownership has been at the core of communal tensions, which have led to the exclusion of foreign migrants and northern ethnic groups. In Guiglo and Duékoué, an unidentified armed group has been targeting foreign communities since June, resulting in the death of at least seven civilians and the displacement of thousands of farm workers of Burkinabé origin, more than 6,000 of whom have fled to the camp for internally displaced persons in Guiglo. In N'Gattadolikro, FANCI has prevented more than 1,000 people, mainly from Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso, from entering Government-controlled zones. During the night of 24/25 July 2004, FANCI elements from Abidjan prevented 126 Burkinabé, including 26 women and 42 children, from returning to their plantations in Gadouan. In addition, 110 families from northern ethnic groups, representing 1,440 persons, are still waiting in Daloa to return to their land. In order to address this situation, the Minister of National Reconciliation has established Community Committees on Reconciliation and Peace which are responsible for the prevention and resolution of conflicts through the sensitization of the population on reconciliation and peace.

VII. Preparations for the elections of October 2005

42. During the reporting period, only limited progress was made in preparing for the elections. The identification process, which is to serve as a basis for voter registration, has been hampered by various problems, including financial constraints facing the National Identification Supervisory Commission and the National Identification Office. Steps need to be taken to increase the capacity of these institutions to carry out the identification process in a timely fashion.

43. As noted above, an extraordinary session of the National Assembly has been convened to consider the laws envisaged under the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, including laws on the Independent Electoral Commission and the nationality code which, under the Accra III Agreement, have to be adopted by 31 August. Moreover, the resolution of the issues relating to the revision of article 35 regarding eligibility for the presidency is to be completed by 30 September. Failure to adopt these laws on time would certainly have negative consequences for the operational timetable for organizing the elections. The Secretariat is planning to send an electoral mission to Côte d'Ivoire in the coming weeks to update an earlier assessment on the electoral process and make recommendations regarding the assistance that the United Nations can provide towards the preparation and conduct of free and fair elections.

VIII. Public information

44. The Operation's radio station, ONUCI FM, began regular broadcasts on 13 August 2004. The launch was made possible following the signing of an agreement on 5 August by my Special Representative and the Chairman of the Board of Radiodiffusion Télévision Ivoirienne at a ceremony chaired by the Prime Minister. ONUCI FM currently covers the greater Abidjan area. In the coming weeks, ONUCI intends to expand its coverage through a system of relays to include

the entire southern part of the country as well as Bouaké, Korhogo, Man and other areas in the north and west under the control of the Forces nouvelles.

45. In accordance with the mandate of the Operation, ONUCI FM will promote peace and national reconciliation in Côte d'Ivoire and provide its listeners with unbiased and non-partisan information, as local media have often encouraged ethnic tensions. In addition to regular news bulletins, ONUCI FM will broadcast cultural, political, economic, entertainment and sports programmes in French and as many as seven local languages, 24 hours a day, seven days a week. At the same time, the public information component of ONUCI will continue its other activities in support of the peace process, including media relations, public outreach, publications and media monitoring.

IX. Humanitarian situation

46. The conflict in Côte d'Ivoire has resulted in a serious deterioration in the social and economic fabric of the country and significant population displacement. There are an estimated 800,000 internally displaced persons, of whom some 500,000 have yet to be resettled. Up to 400,000 persons have fled the country.

47. The humanitarian community continues to play a key role in drawing attention and responding to the humanitarian needs in Côte d'Ivoire. A series of multi-agency and multi-donor field assessment missions, led by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, has provided more precise information on the prevailing humanitarian situation in the north of the country and highlighted a number of humanitarian concerns in all the main sectors. As a result of the collapse in the provision of basic services, urgent unmet needs have been reported in the areas of health, water and sanitation, education and protection. Although there are currently few cases of food shortages and malnutrition in Côte d'Ivoire, the World Food Programme (WFP) is warning that the food security situation remains precarious and could deteriorate, especially in those areas which are hosting displaced populations in the west and in the centre-east. In areas where food is produced in sufficient quantity to feed the population, the general climate of insecurity has caused difficulties in marketing the harvests, thus limiting the generation of much-needed revenues.

48. In areas under the control of the Forces nouvelles, the structures that supported the health-care system collapsed when over 80 per cent of health personnel left the region. As a result of a vaccination campaign in the Danané area, the overall health situation in the west is improving gradually, with a decrease in the number of measles cases. Furthermore, Médecins sans Frontières Belgium reported that the number of children treated for malnutrition at the hospital of Man has decreased slightly. This may be partly due to the resumption of WFP feeding activities. Despite some positive results obtained on the ground, the absence in the north of medical staff, who are essential partners in implementing large health programmes, has negatively affected efforts undertaken by the United Nations Children's Fund and other humanitarian organizations.

49. The third round of polio national immunization days led by the World Health Organization was carried out from 10 to 13 July, targeting 4.5 million children under 5 years of age throughout the country. This round was organized in response to

insufficient coverage during previous campaigns, and will be supplemented by two further rounds scheduled for October and November 2004.

50. In the Forces nouvelles-controlled areas, education remains a challenge. It is estimated that more than 1 million schoolchildren have had their school year disrupted. During recent months the Government organized final examinations in many parts of the west and the north and provided financial support to displaced university students, but many students continue to require assistance. In those areas, communities are coping with voluntary teaching. Despite the high number of volunteer teachers, however, the deployment of qualified teachers and the reopening of schools remain priorities.

51. Some 70,000 Liberian refugees continue to live in Côte d'Ivoire, where they sometimes encounter hostility from local extremist groups and some political leaders. Over 7,000 Liberian refugees were accepted for resettlement to the United States of America and Norway during the past year in a programme managed by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In view of improved conditions and security in Liberia, UNHCR plans to start on 1 October a voluntary repatriation operation for Liberian refugees from Côte d'Ivoire, and also from Guinea and Sierra Leone.

52. The level of humanitarian funding is still low. By early August, only 15.8 per cent of the $61 million requested through the revised consolidated appeal process had been received. However, some $20 million has been allocated for humanitarian activities, outside the appeal process, mainly for the health sector. While the "neither peace, nor war" situation could explain donor hesitancy, it is of paramount importance that funding be increased so that multisectoral humanitarian assistance can be provided to the most vulnerable people.

X. Economic situation

53. The economic implications of the current crisis have been dramatic. Economic indicators all point to a severe recession: businesses are closing down, and the relocation of businesses to other parts of the subregion has accelerated during the past three months as a consequence of the unpredictability of the political situation; unemployment is rising, prices of food commodities and utilities are high, while trade between the north and the south of the country is hindered by checkpoints and the current political situation.

54. The social situation is worrisome. It is estimated that 44 per cent of the population lives below the poverty line, compared to 38 per cent before the crisis of September 2002. As a result of the conflict, there is a real risk of an increase in the prevalence of HIV/AIDS from the current level of 9.7 per cent, already the highest in West Africa. With the deterioration of the economic and social indicators, the *Human Development Report 2004* indicates that Côte d'Ivoire is now 163 out of 167 countries ranked in the Human Development Index.

55. The decline in economic activities resulting from the Ivorian crisis has had a profound impact on the economy of the subregion, especially that of the landlocked countries of Burkina Faso and Mali. The two States depend on the Abidjan port as their gateway to external markets, and have also traditionally provided most of the workforce for the cocoa and coffee plantations which are the backbone of the

Ivorian economy. The suspension of the rail connections between the port of Abidjan and the borders with the two countries has put great strains on their economies, notably because it has forced the rerouting of their external exports through the ports of Tema, Ghana, and Nouakchott. The Government of Mali has estimated that it loses $15 million per month because of the Ivorian crisis.

XI. Mission support

56. On 29 June, ONUCI signed a status-of-forces agreement with the Government. Logistical support is provided for the deployment of troops to the mission and the respective sectors. The contingents from Bangladesh, France, Morocco and Pakistan are operating in the mission area under "wet lease" arrangements and are fully sufficient with respect to their logistics requirements except rations and food, which the United Nations will provide. Meanwhile, the contractual and logistics support arrangements with Pacific Architects and Engineers for the former ECOMICI contingents have been discontinued and memorandums of understanding between the United Nations, France and Belgium are being developed to ensure continuity of support to those contingents.

57. ONUCI negotiated with the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to acquire a building for use as an integrated headquarters for the Operation. The building is currently being refurbished to meet the Operation's requirements.

XII. Financial aspects

58. The General Assembly, by its resolution 58/310 of 18 June 2004, appropriated for ONUCI the amount of $297 million, inclusive of $96.4 million for the establishment of the Operation for the period from 4 April to 30 June 2004 and $200.6 million for its maintenance for the period from 1 July to 31 December 2004. This appropriation has been approved by the Assembly pending review of the budget of the Operation for the 2004/05 financial period during its fifty-ninth session.

59. Owing to the issuance of assessment letters in July 2004, contributions to the special account for ONUCI received by 31 July 2004 amounted to $0.4 million. In the interim, the financial requirements of the Operation are being met from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund.

XIII. Observations

60. The Accra III Agreement, signed by all the Ivorian parties, which contains a framework and timeline for the implementation of the main provisions of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, provides a clear road map for progress in the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire. I welcome the renewed spirit of statesmanship, cooperation, and compromise among the Ivorian parties which allowed the necessary political consensus to be forged at the Accra meeting. The meeting was also a further indication of the strong commitment of the international community and, in particular, African Heads of State, to ensuring the restoration of peace and stability in Côte d'Ivoire, and to assisting the Ivorian parties in their efforts towards that end.

61. It is encouraging that some progress has been made towards implementing the Accra Agreement, including the restoration of the integrity of the Government of National Reconciliation and the resumption of its activities. The National Assembly has also started consideration of key draft legislation envisaged under the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. However, much remains to be done, within a short period of time, and I would urge the Ivorian parties to take all necessary measures to ensure that crucial deadlines envisaged for the adoption of legal reforms and the revision of article 35 of the Constitution on the eligibility criteria for the presidency are closely adhered to. These steps, together with the commencement of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process as scheduled on 15 October and progress towards the restoration of State authority nationwide, constitute essential elements for the restoration of normalcy in Côte d'Ivoire, and for the holding of free and fair elections in October 2005.

62. At this critical juncture, I would like to remind the Ivorian parties of their personal responsibility for ensuring that the commitments made in Accra are translated into concrete actions on the ground which will urgently move the peace process forward. It is also important that the commitment of the international community to the resolution of the Ivorian crisis, as demonstrated by the mission of the Security Council to West Africa in June 2004, and also at the recent Accra III high-level meeting, is maintained. I call on Council members and other concerned stakeholders to continue to urge the Ivorian parties to ensure that the implementation timetable for the Accra III Agreement is closely complied with. The fortnightly reports of the Monitoring Group provide a very useful tool for the international community to follow developments. At the same time, due consideration needs to be given to steps which could help to ensure that the peace process remains on track. I remind the parties, as conveyed to them by the Security Council mission to West Africa during its visit to Abidjan, that the Council intends to consider appropriate, targeted measures against individuals who obstruct the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement.

63. While there have been some recent positive political developments, there remain deep concerns about the human rights situation throughout the country. It is essential that members of the Council continue to urge all Ivorian parties to cooperate with the International Commission of Inquiry, which arrived in Côte d'Ivoire on 15 July and is conducting its investigation into serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law committed since the beginning of the conflict on 19 September 2002. It is only by ensuring that the perpetrators of those atrocities are brought to justice and through effectively addressing the prevailing culture of impunity that a significant improvement in the country's human rights situation will be achieved.

64. I remain seriously concerned about the attacks that have been carried out in recent months against United Nations personnel and property and also other international personnel. It should be reiterated that such attacks are unacceptable, especially since ONUCI was established at the express request of the Government of Côte d'Ivoire and ECOWAS. As stated in the report of the Security Council mission to West Africa (S/2004/525 of 2 July 2004), the Government should take all necessary measures to stop all hostile and/or provocative actions against ONUCI and all United Nations representatives, including the disbanding of militias. Similar guarantees should be provided to all foreign presences in the country, including the Licorne force.

65. In conclusion, the United Nations, ECOWAS, the African Union and the international community stand ready to support the efforts of the Ivorian parties to bring the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire to an end. However, the international community looks to President Gbagbo and the Ivorian leadership as a whole, with whom primary responsibility lies for restoring normalcy, to ensure that substantive progress is made towards the full and unconditional implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement without further delay. Such concerted action is vital to ensure the restoration of durable peace in Côte d'Ivoire and to enhance security and stability in the West African subregion.

66. Finally, I would like to express my appreciation to my Special Representative, Albert Tévoédjrè, the civilian and military staff of ONUCI and the United Nations agencies, as well as humanitarian, development and regional organizations, including the African Union and ECOWAS, and numerous bilateral donors for their steadfast efforts to support the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire.


UNOCI
Deployment
as of 20 August 2004
MALI
BURKINA FASO
GUINEA
LIBERIA
GHANA
CÔTE D'IVOIRE
ATLANTIC OCEAN
Zone of Confidence
Sector Boundary
Mission Headquarters
Sector Headquarters
Infantry Battalion
Infantry Company
Engineer Company
Signals Company
Transportation Company
Headquarters Company
Infantry Platoon
Security Group
UN Military Observers Team
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
0 50 100 150 km
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Interim report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

I. Introduction

1. By its resolution 1542 (2004) of 30 April 2004, the Security Council established the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) for an initial six-month period, with the intention to renew for further periods, and requested that authority be transferred from the Multinational Interim Force (MIF) to MINUSTAH on 1 June 2004. As requested by the Council, the present report describes the implementation of the mandate of MINUSTAH and the progress made in its deployment.

2. On 12 July 2004, I informed the Council of my intention to appoint Juan Gabriel Valdés (Chile) as my Special Representative for Haiti and Head of MINUSTAH (S/2004/565). Mr. Valdés officially assumed his responsibilities on 17 August 2004. Until that time and since 1 June, my Deputy Special Representative for Humanitarian and Development Coordination, Adama Guindo, served as Officer-in-Charge of MINUSTAH, while continuing his functions as Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator. Lieutenant General Augusto Heleno Ribeiro Pereira (Brazil) assumed his functions as Force Commander on 31 May 2004 and David Charles Beer (Canada) will assume his functions as Police Commissioner early in September. My Special Adviser on Haiti, John Reginald Dumas, visited Haiti from 29 May to 9 June and from 17 to 22 August 2004.

II. Deployment of the Mission

Military deployment

3. As stipulated in Security Council resolution 1542 (2004), MINUSTAH formally took over authority from the Multinational Interim Force on 1 June, the Brazilian contingent building up its forces in Port-au-Prince and the Chilean MIF forces being reassigned to MINUSTAH as United Nations peacekeepers. The remaining MIF troops — from Canada, France and the United States of America — continued their activities as foreseen in resolution 1542 (2004), and continued to exercise operational responsibility over the forces in the country.

4. By 25 June, MINUSTAH had built up the minimum military strength required and assumed operational responsibilities from the Multinational Interim Force,

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Brazil providing more than half of the 2,127 troops. The Canadian MIF forces were re-hatted as United Nations peacekeepers until 31 July; the MIF forces from France and the United States of America left by 30 June.

5. In accordance with the military concept of operations, MINUSTAH troops will be deployed throughout Haiti in phases in at least seven sectors. Phase one, which ran from June until the end of July, saw the deployment of the Brazilian brigade in Port-au-Prince, the redeployment of the Canadian company to the greater Gonaïves area and the relocation of a Chilean battalion to Cap-Haïtien, with a detachment in Fort-Liberté. Owing to the limited forces available during this stage — some 2,084 troops — there was no permanent military presence in the other towns of the departments of the West, the Artibonite and the North, but occasional patrols were conducted.

6. In phase two, to be completed by the end of August, the Argentinean battalion replaced the Canadian company in Gonaïves and assumed responsibility for the area from Port-de-Paix through Saint-Marc and south-east to La Chapelle in the department of the Artibonite. The Uruguayan contingent arrived in Port-au-Prince and is being deployed to the south-west, with a primary focus on Les Cayes.

7. Pending the arrival of a contingent from Nepal, the Brazilian brigade continued to operate in a larger than desired area of responsibility, the largest portion of the force being deployed in Port-au-Prince and a platoon temporarily deployed in Hinche. Its frequent foot and vehicle patrols have ensured a visible and deterrent presence. The Brazilian contingent also assumed static security responsibilities in Port-au-Prince, such as providing security for key government sites and facilities, as well as visiting dignitaries. The Chilean contingent patrolled the area of Cap-Haïtien and Fort-Liberté to improve security in the north. More troops will be required, however, to deal successfully with the challenges in more remote municipalities and those along the border with the Dominican Republic.

8. Meanwhile, the Argentinean level II hospital established medical facilities in Port-au-Prince and the Chilean aviation unit (7 helicopters) became operational. It will be augmented by an Argentinean aviation unit of two helicopters late in September. Provisions are being made for a joint Chilean and Ecuadorian engineering company. It is anticipated that approximately 3,000 troops will be operational on the ground by the end of August; as at 17 August, the Mission's troop strength stood at 2,755.

Civilian police deployment

9. On 1 June, a pre-deployment team of eight civilian police officers began establishing the civilian police headquarters, conducting the assessment of the current structure, training requirements, logistics and administration of the Haitian National Police (HNP), and initiated close liaison with HNP. On 17 August, the strength of MINUSTAH civilian police stood at 240 officers, including 5 female officers, from 17 countries. Reconnaissance teams from countries contributing formed police units — China, Jordan, Nepal and Pakistan — visited Haiti during June and early August to evaluate the terrain and plan for their deployment. The first formed police unit, from Jordan, consisting of 125 officers, arrived on 16 August and was operational by 18 August.

10. In accordance with the civilian police concept of operations, the deployment of civilian police officers outside the capital began on 26 July 2004. By 17 August, 22 civilian police officers had been deployed to Cap-Haïtien, 15 to Fort-Liberté, 16 to Gonaïves, 15 to Hinche, 19 to Jacmel, 14 to Jérémie, 17 to Les Cayes and 8 to Port-de-Paix. Regional operational centres were set up in every region where civilian police had been deployed and are functioning 24 hours a day. To support the Haitian National Police in re-establishing their presence and enhance their confidence in dealing with law and order problems, civilian police advisers will be deployed at every decision-making level of HNP and for every special and regional unit. The regions will be reinforced progressively as MINUSTAH military deployments are carried out, evacuation capacities are established, and administrative support is put in place.

III. Security situation

11. Since the arrival of MINUSTAH and the initiation of joint patrolling with the Haitian National Police, the security situation has improved gradually. Armed groups continue to control some parts of the country, however, in particular in the north and the east along the border with the Dominican Republic, and claim to be exercising official security and administrative functions in the absence of a sufficiently strong HNP presence. In other instances, there have been reports of former soldiers sharing offices and patrolling jointly with HNP in some localities. Isolated instances of violence and gunfire, including killings, home invasions, acts of retaliation, kidnappings, gang activity, confrontation between members of HNP and former soldiers of the disbanded Haitian armed forces, vigilante justice and general criminal acts continued to be reported. Armed groups involved in political violence include street gangs, popular organizations that supported former President Aristide, insurgents against the former President, members of the former military, members of disbanded police units, and some organized criminal groups. On 8 July, the Transitional Government's Superior Council on the National Police (Conseil supérieur de la Police nationale), composed of the Prime Minister, the Ministers of Justice and the Interior, the Director General of HNP and the Inspector General in Chief of HNP, issued a communiqué stating that the activities of armed groups presenting themselves as security forces were illegal and that failure to desist from such activities after 15 September 2004 would result in action being taken by the Transitional Government, with the help of MINUSTAH.

12. No incidents targeting MINUSTAH forces have been reported in the period under review. MINUSTAH staff nevertheless continued to require armed escorts for travel outside Port-au-Prince and travel to some areas of the capital remained restricted. The "football for peace" exhibition match on 18 August between the Brazilian and Haitian teams, which was attended by the Presidents of Brazil and Uruguay, took place without incident.

13. Given that the Mission had not yet reached its authorized strength, remote towns and villages remained without a permanent military presence, although occasional patrols were conducted. The lack of a presence in some parts of the country hindered the development of a comprehensive and nuanced security assessment, as reporting was mainly restricted to the major population centres of Port-au-Prince and areas in the north of the country.

IV. Preparations for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

14. Assisting the Transitional Government with the comprehensive and sustainable disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of all armed groups (estimated at a total of 25,000 individuals) many of which are of an informal and unstructured nature, is a formidable challenge for MINUSTAH. In the interim cooperation framework document prepared by the Transitional Government with the support of the international community (see para. 25 below), the Transitional Government committed itself to the creation of a mixed inter-ministerial commission on disarmament and the adoption of the required legal framework, which would represent an important first step towards the development of a national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme and set the framework within which MINUSTAH and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), among others, can start to provide technical assistance. The commission has not yet been established, however, and MINUSTAH continued to encourage the Transitional Government to do so as a matter of priority.

15. In accordance with the Consensus on the Political Transition Pact, signed on 4 April 2004 (see S/2004/300, paras. 12-16), the Transitional Government established a commission, led by the Minister of the Interior, himself a former military officer, to examine the situation of the former armed forces. On 13 August 2004, the Transitional Government further announced the formation of an inter-ministerial commission, including representatives of the former soldiers, to study issues related to the compensation for back pay and retirement funds for members of the former military and to formulate recommendations to the forthcoming elected government on the advisability of reorganizing the military. Many former military refuse to recognize the dissolution of the armed forces in 1995 and claim that the armed forces, enshrined in the Haitian Constitution of 1987, could not be abolished without an amendment to the Constitution. A worrying development is their refusal to disarm until their demands are met, and other armed groups, primarily supporters of Fanmi Lavalas, known as *chimères*, are disarmed first. In a move designed to incorporate them into society, the Transitional Government offered qualifying officers the possibility of joining the ranks of the Haitian National Police. As a result, 200 former soldiers are scheduled to undergo a six-month training, which is equivalent to that of other HNP recruits. On 15 August, members of the former military held peaceful but unauthorized demonstrations in the streets of Port-au-Prince to reiterate their demands. Some of them, armed and in military fatigues, marched in front of the presidential palace.

16. The Transitional Government's setting of a deadline for armed groups, other than HNP, to stop claiming to exercise security functions (see para. 11 above) underlines the urgency for it to put in place a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration framework. Meanwhile, the Haitian authorities have somewhat distanced themselves from that deadline. As a follow-up to the limited disarmament activities of the Multinational Interim Force, MINUSTAH military forces, within their capacities, have been as responsive as possible to information received about weapons caches and have confiscated illegal weapons, when feasible.

V. Support for the rule of law and public security

17. The Haitian National Police, which at the time of my last report relied only on a force of no more than 2,500 (S/2004/300, para. 32), today claims to have 3,567 officers. While this represents an improvement over the situation in April, it remains an insufficient number to provide adequate security for the country's population. Police stations that were destroyed during the fighting and looting experienced in the early months of the year have yet to be repaired. The justice and corrections systems remain in need of overhaul. Some 10 courts of first instance and a number of offices of Justices of the Peace were badly damaged during the events of February 2004 and are still awaiting repairs or reconstruction. Although prisons in some areas of the country have reopened, they are in need of improvements to correct major problems, such as overcrowding and improper facilities.

18. MINUSTAH initiated and held regular meetings with officials from the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Interior and the Haitian National Police to discuss assistance in key areas that would contribute to the further stabilization of the country, particularly the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of all armed groups; preparation of elections; and the reform, restructuring, development and professionalization of HNP. It also held periodic coordination meetings with bilateral and multilateral partners to avoid duplication of efforts to support HNP in their technical, operational, logistics and financial requirements.

19. A team of MINUSTAH civilian police officers has joined the United States and the Organization of American States (OAS) in their efforts to assist HNP in the vetting and selection of HNP aspirants. According to HNP, from June to August 3,803 applicants, including 121 women, were vetted and selected to join the new HNP recruitment programme.

20. As a result of the recruitment undertaken by the HNP authorities, the fifteenth HNP class is scheduled to begin its training on 23 August. MINUSTAH assisted HNP with the preparation of the six-month training programme to ensure that it is in accordance with international policing and human rights standards. A "train-the-trainers" programme was developed in July and will soon be implemented at the HNP Academy in Port-au-Prince, employing 54 local police instructors. MINUSTAH also set up a special training team that will assess needs and prepare a training plan for HNP officers in the regions. In addition, a needs assessment is under way at police stations in the Haitian capital to improve mechanisms in place to respond to the cases of violence against women.

21. As called for in my report of 16 April 2004 (S/2004/300, para. 89), the United Nations carried out additional assessments of the corrections system and the judiciary from 17 to 25 May and from 2 to 12 August to explore what role MINUSTAH could play to assist the Transitional Government in these sectors. As stressed in the interim cooperation framework, the focus of the Mission's work should be on supporting the Transitional Government in strengthening the independence of the judiciary and fortifying systems for holding judicial authorities accountable to applicable legal, professional and ethical standards.

22. The assessment teams concluded that MINUSTAH would need to build on, and complement, the past and ongoing efforts of other partners within and outside the United Nations system, in particular the UNDP programme on the rule of law and prison reform, which has largely re-established the level of programme delivery

achieved before February 2004. To address the needs in Haiti and to augment current UNDP programming, MINUSTAH will require a number of judicial and corrections experts to support Haitian judicial and governmental authorities in strengthening, and where necessary restarting, judicial and corrections systems. The Mission will also need to be able to provide advisers to be co-located with Haitian counterparts in various institutions that are vital to the administration of justice and prisons throughout the country. In addition, the assessment teams recommended that, after the necessary groundwork has been laid, MINUSTAH deploy a team to monitor the judicial system, so as to identify systemic needs and formulate constructive recommendations on how to improve the administration of justice in Haiti.

23. Furthermore, the assessment teams recommended that the efforts of MINUSTAH be combined with current UNDP programming. The precise modalities for cooperation are now being formulated. MINUSTAH efforts in the judicial and corrections areas should begin with the deployment of a few experts, later deployments being carefully phased, taking into account the programming of other international partners, as well as the needs, receptivity and absorption capacity of the national institutions.

VI. Political situation

24. Since the Transitional Government, led by Prime Minister Gérard Latortue, took office on 17 March (see S/2004/300, para. 10), it has begun work to restore governance and prepare the ground for a political transition to an elected Government, in accordance with the priorities and the timeline agreed in the Consensus on the Political Transition Pact. It reaffirmed its commitment to organizing municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections in 2005, restoring macroeconomic stability, initiating a process of national reconciliation and fostering a broad-based political dialogue. On 6 July, the Transitional Government presented its "white paper" containing an overview of its accomplishments during the first 100 days in office. These included the constitution of an independent Provisional Electoral Council, the development of the interim cooperation framework in close collaboration with international partners, the restoration of State institutions that had ceased to function after the events of February 2004, and practical improvements in public services such as the opening of schools, renewed garbage collection, and improvements in the delivery of electricity.

25. During the month of May 2004, the Transitional Government, with the support of bilateral, multilateral and United Nations agencies, prepared the interim cooperation framework, which sets out priorities and targets to respond to the country's urgent and medium-term development needs and bring Haiti through its transition period until September 2006. The interim cooperation framework was developed by working groups composed of over 200 technical experts from the Transitional Government and the international community and focused on four priority areas for action, namely, strengthening political governance and promoting national dialogue; strengthening economic governance and contributing to institutional development; promoting economic recovery; and improving access to basic services. The total needs assessed amounted to $1,370 million, of which $446 million had already been committed by donors. On 20 July, at the International

Donors Conference on Haiti in Washington, D.C., which my Special Representative attended, the international community pledged another $1,085 million.

26. On 23 July, the signatories of the Consensus on the Political Transition Pact agreed to the formation of a follow-up committee to institutionalize the process of overseeing the implementation of the Pact. The Follow-up Committee brings together representatives of the Transitional Government, the Council of Eminent Persons (Conseil des sages), political parties, and civil society groups. Three additional political parties, namely RESPONSE, the Mouvement national et patriotique du 28 novembre (MNP) and the Alliance pour l'avancement d'Haïti (ALAH), have signed the pact. However, Fanmi Lavalas remains outside the main structures involved in the political transition despite the role of the former Prime Minister, Yvon Neptune, in ensuring a smooth transition of power after the departure of former President Aristide in February 2004 (see S/2004/300, para. 9).

27. Tensions have continued to characterize relations between Fanmi Lavalas and the Transitional Government. Members of the party repeatedly alleged that they were subjected to political persecution and staged public demonstrations to demand the release of individuals they claim are political prisoners. The Transitional Government's decision to place a number of Fanmi Lavalas supporters on a list barring them from leaving the country was criticized by Fanmi Lavalas and by a number of human rights organizations. The arrest of former Prime Minister Yvon Neptune on 27 June has been pointed to by many members of Fanmi Lavalas as evidence of political persecution against them. While Mr. Neptune had been detained for his alleged involvement in a massacre in Saint-Marc in February 2004, to date no official charges have been brought against him. He remains in detention. MINUSTAH has emphasized the need to promote the rule of law and to uphold the presumption of innocence until found guilty.

28. During the period under review, Fanmi Lavalas has shown signs of increasing divisions, some prominent politicians previously associated with Fanmi Lavalas having distanced themselves from the administration of former President Aristide. There are also signs that some moderate members may be considering joining the political transition process, if the Transitional Government were to take measures to prevent political persecution. To capitalize on this momentum and as a continuation of efforts undertaken by my Special Adviser early in June to facilitate a rapprochement between the Transitional Government and Fanmi Lavalas, MINUSTAH provided good offices in an effort to broker an agreement between them on the entry of Fanmi Lavalas into the political transition process. A group of former members of Fanmi Lavalas, led by former Senators Prince Pierre Sonson and Dany Toussaint, formed a new political party on 31 July 2004 — the Mouvement démocratique et réformateur haïtien (MODEREH). Although it has not formally signed the Consensus on the Political Transition Pact, it has indicated that it intends to compete in the next elections and be fully involved in the national dialogue by advocating tolerance and reconciliation. With regard to political entities in general, more than 70 political parties and new forces have appeared, so that the political landscape in Haiti remains highly fragmented, even though during the period under review a number of parties initiated negotiations to regroup or form coalitions.

29. The Transitional Government made progress in normalizing relations with the Organization of American States and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). On 8 June, the General Assembly of OAS, by resolution 2058, instructed its Permanent

Council to undertake, in accordance with the principles and purposes of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, including article 20, all necessary diplomatic initiatives, including good offices, to foster full restoration of democracy in Haiti. During the twenty-fifth regular meeting of the Conference of CARICOM Heads of Government, held in Grenada from 4 to 7 July, CARICOM decided to create a channel of engagement with the interim administration of Haiti. A delegation of CARICOM Foreign Ministers then visited Haiti on 13 and 14 July. On 28 July, after considering the report of the CARICOM ministerial delegation, the Bureau of the Conference of Heads of Government arrived at a recommendation on CARICOM relations with the Haitian authorities and requested feedback from its members by 16 August. Owing to a lack of consensus, CARICOM postponed a decision on whether to renew diplomatic ties with Haiti until its November summit in Trinidad and Tobago.

VII. National dialogue and reconciliation

30. The Transitional Government and Haitian political forces have embraced the proposal of an inclusive nationwide dialogue process in order to promote national reconciliation. Details of how the dialogue would be organized, however, remain to be determined. In support of such an initiative, MINUSTAH, in close coordination with UNDP, is exploring ways to assist national stakeholders in formulating the objectives, structure and format of such a national dialogue process, as well as the specific roles of the Transitional Government, political parties, civil society organizations and the international community. Meanwhile, the Transitional Government has engaged in initial consultations with Haitian political forces. Initiatives from civil society groups, such as the proposal for a new "social contract" promoted by the political coalition Group of 184, may also help advance such processes. However, the absence, at present, of Fanmi Lavalas from the political transition process remains an obstacle to any dialogue and reconciliation initiative.

VIII. Preparations for elections

31. On 28 June, a representative of civil society was appointed as the ninth member of the Provisional Electoral Council in lieu of a representative of Fanmi Lavalas. The latter had refrained from nominating a candidate, alleging that it could not engage in the process while suffering political persecution. While it was expected that, upon its completion, the Electoral Council would start working in earnest on the preparation of the elections, it became mired in internal disputes. Political leaders and opinion-makers appealed to Council members to overcome their differences. On 6 August, the Follow-up Committee to the Consensus on the Political Transition Pact helped to broker an agreement among the Council members to move beyond the impasse. The agreement provided inter alia for the appointment of a temporary Council spokesperson; the temporary adoption of the rules of procedure of the previous Provisional Electoral Council of 30 May 2001; the appointment of a seven-person committee made up of four Council members and three members of the Follow-up Committee to draft new rules of procedure with the assistance of two international experts from the International Organization of la Francophonie; and a review of contested staff appointments. Although the Provisional Electoral Council has resumed its weekly meetings, the agreement

remains precarious and the start of field operations is hampered by continued scarcity of resources.

32. The Provisional Electoral Council has so far not drawn up the time frames for the elections or taken a decision regarding the sequence and number of votes. Whereas the Transitional Government had voiced a preference for three separate votes, several parties have expressed concern that such a sequence would imply a full year of campaigning — a task they claim they cannot afford. Although a final decision belongs to the Provisional Electoral Council, political forces have expressed the wish to be consulted on the matter.

33. On 15 April the Transitional Government requested United Nations assistance in the elections. A mission was accordingly sent to Haiti from 8 to 17 June to assess the electoral needs and determine the modalities for the assistance of the international community, in particular that of the United Nations, in this area. The team met with the interim President, the interim Prime Minister, representatives of political parties, civil society and religious leaders and held working sessions with members of the Provisional Electoral Council, which was not yet fully constituted. Its interlocutors stressed the importance of United Nations assistance to ensure an electoral process that is free, fair and transparent. The simultaneous presence in Haiti of an electoral expert team from OAS allowed for close consultations on the ground, including on cooperation and coordination between the two organizations in the electoral field.

34. The United Nations assessment mission recommended action in such areas as amendments to the electoral law and related regulations; training and direct technical assistance to the Provisional Electoral Council on administrative and financial matters as well as operational planning; the establishment of a voters list; and the development of a broad civic education campaign. It also recommended that joint municipal and parliamentary elections be held first, towards the middle of 2005, and that presidential polls be held towards the end of 2005. MINUSTAH would provide the necessary guidance and supervise the electoral process, and would coordinate and monitor international technical assistance for the elections.

35. Consultations with OAS on the modalities of cooperation in the electoral field have been undertaken. It is expected that they will be soon formalized in a memorandum of understanding that will take into account each organization's mandate and experience and seek the most efficient use of available resources. The Mission will also develop a collaborative approach with other international organizations willing to support the electoral process, in particular CARICOM. MINUSTAH has begun to help support the Provisional Electoral Council and to reach out to political and non-governmental organizations in an effort to promote the participation of women in political life and in all aspects of the electoral process.

IX. Restoration of State authority

36. During the reporting period, the Transitional Government has made moderate strides forward in its capacity to extend State authority outside Port-au-Prince. As of the first week of August, the Transitional Government had appointed 103 of 139 municipal commissions. A number of municipalities, however, remain without a mayor. At the same time, in those areas where a local government is in place, many of the municipal structures lack appropriate infrastructure and basic facilities

because of the looting that occurred in February 2004. Some social and political forces in the communities are concerned about the lack of consultation on the appointment of municipal authorities by the Transitional Government, as prescribed in the Consensus on the Political Transition Pact.

37. MINUSTAH has established close contact with the various levels of State administration, including the central authorities in charge of local government, regional delegates and municipal councils, during regular visits throughout the country in advance of a full permanent presence. This has helped MINUSTAH to start identifying local needs and develop a municipal database. In consultation with key institutions of central government, the Mission has also begun assessing needs in the area of public administration, local management skills and good governance. Municipal governments have expressed a keen interest in receiving training in those areas. These initiatives will build upon ongoing UNDP programmes for the modernization of State institutions and effective decentralization. A team of national experts is currently working with the Prime Minister's Office to fine-tune the legal framework and conduct pilot initiatives, such as a registry of public servants at the regional and municipal levels. MINUSTAH is working in conjunction with UNDP, OAS and European Union programmes on decentralization, and the establishment and strengthening of legitimate local authority.

38. MINUSTAH established a quick-impact project review committee in support of civil society initiatives and public institutions. So far, some 80 projects have been reviewed and 27 have been approved, including sanitation projects; small income-generating projects for groups of women, youth, and farmers; sewage system rehabilitation; garbage collection; improvement of drinking water systems; delivery of electricity; rehabilitation of dispensaries/hospitals; child protection and HIV/AIDS programmes. The Mission's assistance through quick-impact projects has been well received by the local population. MINUSTAH troops have also played an important role in identifying and implementing small-scale engineering projects.

39. The civilian component of the Mission is based primarily in the capital at this stage, and is currently deploying into Gonaïves, Cap-Haïtien and Les Cayes. A presence outside the capital will facilitate regular contacts with local authorities and civil society, as well as the implementation of and follow-up to quick-impact projects.

X. Human rights

40. Insecurity and continued problems in the functioning of law enforcement structures contribute to the continuing precariousness of the human rights situation. Abuses of particular concern include the detention conditions in prisons and at police stations, as well as cases of arrest without warrant, wrongful detention, non-respect of the constitutional 48-hour period established for those arrested to appear before a judge and problems in the juvenile justice system.

41. During the reporting period, the human rights adviser to the United Nations country team worked closely with the substantive components of MINUSTAH on human rights issues pending the deployment of the Mission's human rights component. Joint visits to prisons and police stations with MINUSTAH civilian police officers and military officers were conducted in Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haïtien and Hinche. The human rights adviser held regular consultations with the Haitian

authorities, civil society groups, United Nations agencies, OAS and the diplomatic community on possible courses of action to promote the respect for human rights during the transition period, with a particular focus on violations of individual rights, conditions in prisons and police stations, arbitrary arrest and wrongful detention.

42. The trial of Louis Jodel Chamblain opened on 16 August 2004 in a special criminal court in Port-au-Prince. He allegedly participated in the assassination of Antoine Izmery, a businessman and adviser to former President Aristide, in September 1993. At the time of the murder, Mr. Chamblain was co-leader of the Front révolutionnaire pour l'avancement et le progrès en Haïti (FRAPH), a paramilitary group responsible for many killings and human rights violations when Haiti was under military rule. After only 16 hours of hearing, the jury acquitted Mr. Chamblain and his co-defendant, Jackson Joanis, a former Haitian army captain, in the Izmery case, but both remain in prison pending further trials. Members of the diplomatic community, OAS, and international and national human rights groups denounced the trial as not meeting minimum standards and expressed concern at the haste with which the Transitional Government has arrested members of Fanmi Lavalas suspected of political violence or corruption (see para. 27 above), while failing to act against perpetrators of serious human rights violations.

XI. Humanitarian situation and development

43. The humanitarian situation in Haiti remains complex, compounded by chronic poverty and environmental degradation. The southern part of Haiti suffered major floods on 24 and 25 May, which severely affected the towns of Mapou and Fonds Verrettes, killing, according to government figures, 1,261 persons, with 1,414 more missing. These events highlighted the difficulties of Haiti in responding adequately to natural disasters. The Multinational Interim Force provided much-needed helicopter assistance, allowing supplies to be transported to the affected areas. The region continues to receive support from United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations and is in a process of rehabilitation.

44. In anticipation of the arrival of MINUSTAH humanitarian affairs officers, a team from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance supported MINUSTAH on humanitarian matters and fulfilled the role of humanitarian and civil-military coordinator. MINUSTAH has initiated the preparations to ensure that it has the necessary capacity to support the response to complex emergencies and natural disasters in coordination with other actors on the ground. United Nations inter-agency assessment missions were deployed to follow up on the recent floods and to identify possible vulnerable areas.

45. During the month of May, UNDP officers provided substantive input as well as coordination and logistics support to the interim cooperation framework process and drew upon previous efforts to develop an interim poverty reduction strategy paper. The interim cooperation framework will be recognized as the interim poverty reduction strategy paper, thus allowing the Transitional Government to deepen its relations with the International Monetary Fund. UNDP also served on the steering committee of the interim cooperation framework, alongside the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the European Commission. Representatives of the diplomatic community have urged the establishment of strong and

internationally supervised mechanisms to ensure good governance and prevent corruption, particularly in the light of the imminent disbursement of international assistance under the interim cooperation framework. The Transitional Government and its international partners are currently designing the mechanisms and institutional frameworks to ensure a swift, transparent and effective implementation of the interim cooperation framework.

46. MINUSTAH initiated consultations with civil society groups on women's participation in political life, and the special concerns of women and children in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts and in the restructuring of the judiciary and the corrections system. MINUSTAH has also embarked upon a gender sensibilization campaign with the civilian, military and civilian police components of the Mission. MINUSTAH contributed to the United Nations Inter-Agency National Plan on Sexual Violence against Women, which emphasizes the need to strengthen coordinated actions of prevention and support to victims of gender-based violence, including sexual violence, under the leadership of the Ministry for the Status of Women. MINUSTAH, together with UNAIDS, UNFPA and national partners, has participated in the development of a joint project to set up a training programme on HIV/AIDS with a gender perspective for the Haitian National Police.

XII. Coordination and cooperation with the Organization of American States and the Caribbean Community

47. The regional partners of Haiti have taken a prominent role in providing assistance to the country, as evidenced by the deployed and pledged troop contributions and the important involvement of regional and subregional organizations. Close cooperation has been established between MINUSTAH and the OAS Special Mission in the area of electoral support and assistance to the Haitian National Police. A memorandum of understanding between the United Nations and OAS on electoral assistance, setting out the scope of collaborative efforts, defining the respective functions and activities of each organization, and laying down the modalities of a cooperation mechanism is being finalized (see also para. 35 above).

48. Since June, bimonthly meetings of the major stakeholders in Haiti, including the diplomatic corps, international financial institutions, and regional and subregional organizations, have been convened by the Officer-in-Charge of MINUSTAH to exchange information and discuss issues of concern. These meetings were held in anticipation of the forthcoming creation by my Special Representative of the Core Group, as envisaged in my report of 16 April 2004 (see S/2004/300, para. 81) and endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 1542 (2004).

XIII. Mission support

49. The need for MINUSTAH to become operational rapidly has been a serious test for the support component of the Mission. In particular, it has not been easy to find suitable premises for the Mission. Pending the refurbishment of the premises for the MINUSTAH integrated headquarters in Port-au-Prince, which was handed over by the Transitional Government on 13 August, the United Nations House has accommodated a temporary mission headquarters of limited capacity on its grounds. Support bases for military contingents have been established either through

commercial rental or Government-provided rental-free premises in several locations in Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haïtien and Gonaïves. Arrangements are currently being made for the provision of premises in Fort-Liberté, Les Cayes, Jacmel, Hinche and Saint-Marc. Level III medical evacuation arrangements and emergency medical evacuation arrangements to Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic and Miami in the United States have been put in place. During the start-up phase of MINUSTAH, UNDP provided invaluable support with a range of essential basic services, including financial services, logistics, customs clearance, transportation, office space and utilities. The status-of-forces agreement between MINUSTAH and the Transitional Government was signed on 9 July and entered into force on the same date.

XIV. Financial aspects

50. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions authorized resources in the amount of $49,259,800 for the period from 1 May to 30 June 2004 for the establishment of the Mission under the terms of section IV of General Assembly resolution 49/233 A of 23 December 1994. The General Assembly, by its resolution 58/311 of 18 June 2004, authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments in the amount of $172,480,500 for the maintenance of the Mission for the period from 1 July to 31 October 2004, and decided to apportion among Member States the amount of $221,740,300 for the period from 1 May to 31 October 2004. The report containing the budget for the period from 1 May 2004 to 30 June 2005 is in preparation, and will be reviewed by the Assembly during its fifty-ninth session.

51. As at 31 July 2004, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for MINUSTAH amounted to $218.3 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to $2,478 million.

XV. Observations

52. MINUSTAH has made a promising start with the assumption of security responsibilities from the Multinational Interim Force and progressive stabilization efforts in major areas of the country. I would like to extend my appreciation to the MIF contributing countries for their valuable contribution. I am pleased to note that the Mission's deployment has been generally well received. In order to establish a credible presence throughout Haiti, it is however important that the deployment of the remaining MINUSTAH elements be accelerated. I would like to express my appreciation to the countries that have pledged to contribute troops and civilian police to the Mission, and urge that they do their utmost to expedite the early deployment of their personnel. The special effort on the part of Member States to provide French-speaking personnel, in particular civilian police officers, is welcome and should be sustained.

53. The Transitional Government and the international community share a common desire to see Haiti overcome its present challenges and a common vision on how to achieve this. This has been confirmed by the interim cooperation framework process and the ensuing Donors Conference in Washington, D.C. Both

the Haitian authorities and the international community are now ready to build on a common platform of shared goals during the transition period to prepare the ground for long-term stability, democracy and sustainable development. I applaud the Haitians' determination to steer their country towards a better future. The international community will accompany them along the way as a reliable and long-term partner.

54. The Transitional Government, civil society and political forces have made incremental but encouraging strides towards establishing a dialogue on the key challenges facing the country. It is my hope that a comprehensive national dialogue process will help to bring together all major political movements, regardless of affiliation, to participate in the transition. Recrimination and revenge have all too often characterized the past and should be laid to rest. The United Nations stands ready to further assist in this endeavour.

55. I salute the support of Prime Minister Latortue for nationwide reconciliation, but must emphasize that this cannot be separated from an even-handed fight against impunity and the enforcement of accountability. The restoration of the rule of law will be crucial to restoring the confidence of citizens in the institutions of the State. The Government of Haiti must do more to establish a well-functioning justice system that is accessible to all and operates free of inappropriate governmental, political or private influence. I remain concerned about reports of double standards in the administration of justice. The sudden acquittal of a former paramilitary leader accused of murder at a trial during which the proper procedures were not respected stands in sharp contrast with a commitment to tackle impunity effectively. The establishment of administrative lists of citizens barred from travelling abroad, without judicial justification, is also a matter of concern.

56. Regrettably, illegitimate armed groups have continued to exercise official security and administrative functions. The existence of these parallel structures serves to undermine the legitimacy of the institutions of Haiti. I therefore urge the Transitional Government to strengthen the country's legitimate democratic institutions while overhauling or abolishing those that do not meet democratic standards.

57. Disarming armed groups and training a professional national police must be an integral part of these efforts. I urge the Transitional Government, as a matter of priority, to establish a national commission on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. This is the first step towards a comprehensive, sustainable and equitable disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. I call upon all concerned to lay down their arms and to refrain from violence in order to allow the political process, including the electoral process, to unfold free from undue pressure. Within the limits of its mandate, MINUSTAH will not fail to help the Haitian authorities to address these formidable challenges.

58. While the Transitional Government's determination to prepare for elections in 2005 is promising, the Provisional Electoral Council needs effectively to implement its responsibilities without undue delay. I trust that, with the assistance of the United Nations and OAS, as well as other important organizations active in the electoral field, it will be possible to lay the ground for a sound and transparent electoral process that deserves the confidence of voters. In this process, the Provisional Electoral Council must be seen as independent, inclusive, effective and reliable by

all political forces if the forthcoming elections are to be credible and lead to democratic institutions that are accepted and unchallenged.

59. It is encouraging that the overall situation has become calmer and more stable. However, it is clear that the efforts to ensure a stable environment, support the political process, and assist in the upcoming elections must be accompanied by sustainable economic development and income-generating activities. In this regard, the Donors Conference for Haiti in July saw a favourable response to the short- and medium-term needs identified in the interim cooperation framework. I appeal to donors to deliver on these commitments in a timely manner. Haiti has taken the first steps down the path of stability and development. The country needs the help of the international community to continue on a sure footing.

60. In conclusion, I would like to extend my appreciation to my Special Adviser, John Reginald Dumas, for his personal commitment to Haiti during his six-month tenure and for ensuring a smooth handover to my Special Representative. I would also like to commend the Deputy Special Representative for Humanitarian and Development Coordination for taking on the additional responsibility of Officer-in-Charge until the arrival of my Special Representative. The men and women of MINUSTAH deserve our gratitude for their tireless work to establish a mission in a short time and for their efforts in contributing to peace and security in Haiti. I am also indebted to representatives of regional and subregional organizations, United Nations funds, agencies and programmes and bilateral donors for their continuing efforts to support Haiti through a difficult period of transition.

Annex I

United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti: Countries providing military staff and contingents (as at 17 August 2004)

Country	*Staff officers*	*Troops*	*Total*
Argentina	6	480	486
Benin	3	-	3
Bolivia	6	-	6
Brazil	12	1 198	1 210
Chile	6	448	454
Croatia	1	-	1
France	2	-	2
Nepal	6	-	6
Paraguay	6	-	6
Peru	2	-	2
United States of America	4	-	4
Uruguay	4	571	575
Total	**58**	**2 697**	**2 755**

Annex II

United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti: Countries providing civilian police officers and formed police units (as at 17 August 2004)

Country	*Civilian police officers*	*Formed police units*	*Total*
Benin	9	-	9
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3	-	3
Burkina Faso	39	-	39
Cameroon	43	-	43
Canada	26	-	26
Chad	1	-	1
Chile	2	-	2
China	1	-	1
France	32	-	32
Ghana	2	-	2
Jordan	1	125	126
Mali	8	-	8
Niger	7	-	7
Portugal	5	-	5
Senegal	51	-	51
Sierra Leone	5	-	5
Turkey	5	-	5
Total	**240**	**125**	**365**



Map No. 4224 UNITED NATIONS
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United Nations A/58/879–S/2004/699

General Assembly
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English
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General Assembly
Fifty-eighth session
Agenda item 37
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Fifty-ninth year

Identical letters dated 30 August 2004 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit a letter from the Government of Lebanon addressed to you regarding the proposed submission to the Security Council of a draft resolution on Syrian-Lebanese relations (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have this letter and its annex circulated to members of the Security Council and issued as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 37, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Sami **Kronfol**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

04-47254 (E) 300804 300804

Annex to the identical letters dated 30 August 2004 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

The Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations has informed us that a United States-French draft resolution is currently being circulated calling for the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, an end to intervention by the Syrian Arab Republic in the Lebanese presidential elections, and suspension of support by the Syrian Arab Republic for terrorist organizations in Lebanon.

May we point out that proceeding with such a draft resolution would set a dangerous precedent, in violation of international law and norms, for the following reasons:

First, the submission of this draft resolution coincides with the forthcoming presidential elections in Lebanon. The timing of the submission could adversely affect the electoral process and the Security Council would subsequently be seen as a tool of intervention in Lebanon's internal affairs.

Second, the presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon is linked to the Taif Treaty and other bilateral treaties between the Governments of Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. The implementation of this Treaty is entrusted to the appropriate legitimate institutions in each country. No external entities are entitled to intervene in the details of the Treaty, or to impose amendments to its text. This situation, in our view, serves the common interests of the two countries, which alone must determine the extent, limits, necessity and development thereof.

Third, the claim that the Syrian Arab Republic is backing terrorist organizations in Lebanon defies the truth. The Syrian Arab Republic's role in Lebanon has been, and remains, one that supports and strengthens the official security institutions. It is contributing to the maintenance of security in Lebanon, as is clearly demonstrated by the stability prevailing in Lebanon, which can be confirmed internationally, except for the daily Israeli violations of Lebanon's airspace and borders.

Fourth, the attempt by some countries to intervene in Lebanese internal affairs under the pretext of respect for the Constitution on the eve of the presidential elections is a cover for political intentions of no relevance to such claims. Such intentions are aimed at creating an atmosphere of instability that would only expose the country to grave dangers.

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The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Fifty-ninth year

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On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit a letter from the Government of Lebanon addressed to you regarding an initiative to submit to the Security Council a draft resolution on Syrian-Lebanese relations (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have this letter and its annex circulated to members of the Security Council and issued as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 37, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Sami **Kronfol**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* Reissued for technical reasons.

04-47254* (E) 310804 310804

Annex to the identical letters dated 30 August 2004 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

The Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations has informed us of the existence of an initiative to submit a United States-French draft resolution urging the Syrian Arab Republic to withdraw its troops from Lebanon, to refrain from interfering in the Lebanese presidential elections and to cease supporting terrorist groups in Lebanon.

May we point out that proceeding with such a draft resolution would set a dangerous precedent, in violation of international law and norms, for the following reasons:

1. The submission of this draft resolution coincides with the forthcoming presidential elections in Lebanon. It is therefore to be feared that the timing of its submission could adversely affect the electoral process and that the Security Council could subsequently be seen as a tool of intervention in Lebanon's internal affairs.

2. The presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon is linked to the Taif Treaty and other bilateral agreements between the Governments of Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. This presence is under the auspices and supervision of the competent legitimate institutions in each country. No external entity is entitled to intervene with regard to its modalities or to impose changes. In our view, this presence serves the many common interests of the two countries, which alone must determine the extent, limits, necessity and development thereof.

3. The allegation that the Syrian Arab Republic is backing terrorist organizations in Lebanon defies the truth. The Syrian Arab Republic's role in Lebanon has always been to support and strengthen the official security institutions. It is contributing to the maintenance of security in Lebanon, as is clearly demonstrated by the stability prevailing in Lebanon, which is internationally recognized, and the general calm, except for the daily Israeli violations of Lebanon's airspace and borders.

4. The attempt made by certain States to interfere in Lebanon's internal affairs under the pretext of respect for the Constitution on the eve of the presidential elections is a cover for political intentions of no relevance to such claims, aimed at manipulating the domestic situation and creating conditions of instability which would only expose the country to grave dangers.

5. We hope that the Secretary-General of the United Nations will intervene with the Security Council to prevent this draft resolution from going forward and avert this grave precedent which could lead the United Nations to abandon its fundamental role and become involved in the internal affairs of a Member State.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the text of this letter to be circulated as a document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

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30 August 2004

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General Assembly
Fifty-eighth session
Agenda item 30
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Fifty-ninth year

Letter dated 27 August 2004 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government and further to the letter dated 26 July 2004, addressed to you by H.E. Mr. Andreas D. Mavroyiannis, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Cyprus to the United Nations, I have the honour to draw your attention to new violations of the flight information region (FIR) of Nicosia and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by military aircraft of the Turkish Air Force, recorded on 21, 26, 27, 28 and 29 July 2004 and on 2, 3, 4, 15, 18 and 19 August 2004, as follows:

On 21 July 2004, one C-130 Turkish military aircraft took off from the illegal airport of Lefkoniko, violating the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus and flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria before exiting towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 26 July 2004, four F-4 Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara in one formation entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations before departing in a reverse direction.

On 27 July 2004, eight F-16 Turkish military aircraft, coming in two formations, 10 F-4 Turkish military aircraft, in two formations three KC-135R and two CN-235 Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, in a total of 16 violations of international air traffic regulations and 11 violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, as follows:

(a) The first formation of F-16 Turkish military aircraft, coming from the FIR of Ankara, entered the FIR of Nicosia, exited towards an easterly direction and re-entered the FIR of Nicosia before departing in a reverse direction;

(b) The second formation of F-16 Turkish military aircraft, coming from the FIR of Ankara, entered the FIR of Nicosia, flying over the occupied area of Cape Apostolos Andreas and violating the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus before exiting in an easterly direction. The same formation of aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia on the same day to depart again in a reverse direction;

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(c) The third formation of F-4 Turkish military aircraft, coming from the FIR of Ankara, entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus and flying over the occupied area of Cape Apostolos Andreas before exiting in an easterly direction. The same formation of aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia on the same day and departed again in a reverse direction;

(d) The fourth formation of F-4 Turkish military aircraft, coming from the FIR of Ankara, entered the FIR of Nicosia, exited in an easterly direction and re-entered the FIR of Nicosia to depart later in a reverse direction;

(e) The KC-135R Turkish military aircraft, coming from the FIR of Ankara, entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus and flying over the occupied area of Cape Apostolos Andreas before exiting in an easterly direction. They entered again the FIR of Nicosia on the same day and departed in a reverse direction;

(f) The CN-235 Turkish military aircraft, coming from the FIR of Ankara, entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus and flying over the occupied area of Cape Apostolos Andreas in a search and rescue mission before exiting in a reverse direction;

On 28 July 2004, 16 F-16, coming in four formations, two KC-135R, one C-130 and two CN-235 Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, in a total of 16 violations of international air traffic regulations and 12 violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, as follows:

(a) The first and second formations of F-16 Turkish military aircraft, coming from the FIR of Ankara, entered the FIR of Nicosia before exiting towards an easterly direction. They re-entered the FIR of Nicosia, whence they departed on the same day in a reverse direction;

(b) The third and fourth formations of F-16 Turkish military aircraft, coming from the FIR of Ankara, entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus and flying over the occupied area of Cape Apostolos Andreas before exiting in an easterly direction. They re-entered the FIR of Nicosia, whence they departed in reverse direction;

(c) The KC-135R, coming from the FIR of Ankara, entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus and flying over the occupied area of Cape Apostolos Andreas before exiting in an easterly direction. They re-entered the FIR of Nicosia, whence they departed in a reverse direction;

(d) The CN-235, coming from the FIR of Ankara, entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus and flying over the occupied area of Cape Apostolos Andreas in a search and rescue mission before exiting in a reverse direction;

(e) The C-130, coming from the FIR of Ankara, violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, whence it departed on the same day in a reverse direction.

It should be noted that the aforementioned violations (except the violation of the C-130) were part of a search and rescue exercise conducted in cooperation with the Turkish Navy, north-east of Cyprus.

On 29 July 2004, eight F-16, coming in two formations, eight F-4 in another two formations, three KC-135R, one Turkish military aircraft of unknown type and two CN-235 Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, in a total of 17 violations of international air traffic regulations and 13 violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, as follows:

(a) The first formation of F-16 Turkish military aircraft, coming from the FIR of Ankara, entered the FIR of Nicosia, departed in an easterly direction, and re-entered the FIR of Nicosia, before departing again in a reverse direction;

(b) The second formation of F-16 Turkish military aircraft, coming from the FIR of Ankara, entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus and flying over the occupied area of Cape Apostolos Andreas, exited in an easterly direction and re-entered the FIR of Nicosia, whence it departed in a reverse direction;

(c) The third formation of F-4 Turkish military aircraft, coming from the FIR of Ankara, entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus and flying over the occupied area of Cape Apostolos Andreas, exiting in an easterly direction before re-entering the FIR of Nicosia, whence it departed in a reverse direction;

(d) The fourth formation of F-4 Turkish military aircraft, coming from the FIR of Ankara, entered the FIR of Nicosia and exited in an easterly direction before re-entering the FIR of Nicosia, whence it departed in a reverse direction;

(e) The KC-135R Turkish military aircraft, coming from the FIR of Ankara, entered the FIR of Nicosia, flying over the occupied area of Cape Apostolos Andreas and exiting in an easterly direction before re-entering the FIR of Nicosia, whence they departed in a reverse direction;

(f) The CN-235 Turkish military aircraft, coming from the FIR of Ankara, entered the FIR of Nicosia, flying over the occupied area of Cape Apostolos Andreas in a search and rescue mission and violating the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus before departing in a reverse direction;

(g) The Turkish military aircraft of unknown type took off from the illegal airport of Krini, violating the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus before landing at the same airport.

It should be noted that the aforementioned violations were part of a search and rescue exercise conducted in cooperation with the Turkish Navy, north-east of Cyprus.

On 2 August 2004, one Turkish military aircraft of unknown type entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus and flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, where it remained.

On 3 August 2004, one Turkish military aircraft of unknown type took off from the illegal airport of Tymbou, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus and flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria before exiting towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 4 August 2004, one C-130 Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the

Republic of Cyprus and flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, whence it departed on the same day in a reverse direction.

On 15 August 2004, one Turkish military aircraft of unknown type and one Super Kingair 200 Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus and flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, whence they departed on the same day in a reverse direction.

On 18 August 2004, one C-130 Turkish military aircraft and two B-200 Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus and flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, whence they departed on the same day in a reverse direction.

On 19 August 2004, three F-5 Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia in one formation, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus and flying over the occupied area of Kyrenia before exiting towards the FIR of Ankara.

As repeatedly indicated in our previous communications, the aforementioned violations blatantly contravene international law and air traffic regulations and seriously endanger international civil aviation. Moreover, such actions undermine the efforts made for reconciliation and unification in Cyprus and disappointingly reveal Turkey's lack of good will to achieve a resolution for this long-standing problem.

On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, I strongly protest the above violations and call for their immediate cessation. The Government of Turkey should heed the call of the international community, abide by the Charter of the United Nations and respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, contributing thus to the creation of the required conditions for the achievement of a just and viable solution to the Cyprus problem.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 30, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Andreas **Hadjichrysanthou**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

United Nations S/2004/701

Security Council

Distr.: General
31 August 2004

Original: English

Letter dated 31 August 2004 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter dated 28 August 2004 from Mustafa Osman Ismail, Minister for Foreign Affairs, addressed to the President of the Security Council regarding the measures taken by the Government of the Republic of the Sudan in compliance with Security Council resolution 1556 (2004) and the Darfur Plan of Action (see annex).

I would highly appreciate it if you could circulate the present letter and its annexes as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Elfatih **Erwa**
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 31 August 2004 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

?. I have the honour to inform you about the specific measures taken by the Government of the Sudan in compliance with Security Council resolution 1566 (2004) and the Darfur Plan of Action agreed to by the Government of the Sudan and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Sudan (see S/2004/636, annex):

1. Paragraphs 1 and 4-6 of Security Council resolution 1556 (2004)

(a) Relief assistance

(i) Since July 2004 the Government of the Sudan has donated 12,000 metric tons of food items to the needy population in Darfur;

(ii) All administrative and regulatory procedures relative to the relief assistance have been suspended with a view to facilitating the quick and timely delivery of emergency assistance to Darfur. Visas for relief workers are now delivered upon arrival at national airports. International relief flights are received directly at Darfur airports. Free movement to and within Darfur is guaranteed all relief workers. International non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are registered to operate Darfur within a short time span; currently 50 NGOs are working in the region. The Government of the Sudan has extended the temporary registration duration for NGOs for one year, up to July 2005; the Government stands ready to extend the duration further if the need arises. Relief needs (spare parts, communications equipment, food assistance, medication and so on) are imported duty-free through a fast-track procedure.

(b) Health situation

(i) Secondary health-care indicators

a. Number of internally displaced persons having geographical access to hospitals:

i. Northern Darfur: 68 per cent;

ii. Southern Darfur: 77 per cent;

iii. Western Darfur: 73 per cent;

b. The Government of the Sudan has deployed additional surgeons and surgery registrars to fill the gap in the main hospitals in Darfur;

c. Number of hospitals waiving patient fees for internally displaced persons in Darfur:

i. Northern Darfur: 3;

ii. Southern Darfur: 2;

iii. Western Darfur: 3;

(ii) Primary health care

a. Number of internally displaced persons having geographical access to primary health care:

i. Northern Darfur: 78 per cent;

ii. Southern Darfur: 77 per cent;

iii. Western Darfur: 80 per cent;

b. Number of functional primary health care units:

i. Northern Darfur: 27;

ii. Southern Darfur: 15;

iii. Western Darfur: 39;

c. Number of camps of internally displaced persons with safe delivery capability:

i. Northern Darfur: 5;

ii. Southern Darfur: 5;

iii. Western Darfur: 8;

iv. Some 70 per cent of women in camps of internally displaced persons have access to clean delivery and emergency obstetric care equipment.

(c) Human rights

(i) Appropriate legal measures are being taken against the perpetrators of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including police officers, whose immunities have been withdrawn to enable them to face legal charges. So far 12 people from the Janjaweed have been indicted and sentenced, 3 of them to capital punishment, according to articles 21, 130 and 165 of the Sudanese Penal Code;

(ii) The Advisory Council for Human Rights is conducting thorough investigations of human rights violations reported by the United Nations, the African Union and other sources. Missions from the Council have been sent to Darfur for that purpose;

(iii) The Government of the Sudan made available all the financial needs for the Independent Investigation Committee established by presidential decree under the chairmanship of Daffalla Alhaj Yousuf. The Committee visited Darfur and concluded its report, which was submitted to the President of the Republic. The recommendations contained therein will be thoroughly executed;

(iv) The United Nations human rights monitors are now stationed in Darfur implementing their mandate with full cooperation from the Government of the Sudan;

(v) A commission for the investigation of crimes of rape and other violence against women was established by a ministerial decree of the Minister of Justice. The commission is composed of female justices, attorneys and police officers to guarantee easy and effective inquiry and investigation of the female victims. The commission is continuing its work and its recommendations are being implemented;

(vi) Despite the fact that the Government of the Sudan still receives reports of violence against women, it is to be noted that the number of those incidents is lower than what used to be received in the past. The commissions established for that purpose together with the human rights monitors are continuing their investigations. The perpetrators will be brought to justice.

(d) Security

(i) The Government of the Sudan has so far deployed into Darfur 10,000 police officers from other states, equipped and mandated to secure the camps of internally displaced persons and areas around major towns in Darfur. Courses on human rights and international humanitarian law education have been attended by those officers. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat organized workshops for the police officers in Northern Darfur on 7 and 8 August 2004;

(ii) In accordance with the Darfur Plan of Action, the Government of the Sudan is in the process of implementing the safe and secure areas commitment in camps of internally displaced persons and in a 20-kilometre radius around major towns (details may be found in the attached documents);[a]

(iii) The Government of the Sudan has stopped all military offensive acts, in compliance with the N'Djamena Ceasefire Agreement; the military force in Darfur has been redeployed in a way that precludes any contact with the camps of internally displaced persons and vulnerable civilians;

(iv) The Minister of the Interior, Representative of the President in Darfur, has issued directives prohibiting the carrying of arms in the safe areas except by police.

(e) Reining in the militias

(i) The Minister of the Interior, Representative of the President in Darfur, issued a ministerial decree reducing the number of members of the Popular Defence Force in Darfur by 30 per cent; the demobilization rate will reach 100 per cent depending on the security situation. (Relevant documents are attached);[a]

(ii) Military commissions were established for the encampment of all militias allied with the Government. Collection of military uniforms has already started. Militia leaders are being instructed to abide by the agreements reached with the United Nations. Collection of arms from the Popular Defence Force has already started; the Special Representative of the Secretary-General will be informed of the details of the arms collected. The disarmament process will get into full swing in tandem with the collection of arms from the rebels and other irregular armed groups.

(f) Voluntary repatriation of internally displaced persons

(i) The Joint Implementation Mechanism, which visited Darfur during the first half of August 2004, did not establish any incident of forced repatriation of internally displaced persons;

(ii) With a view to ensuring the voluntary nature of repatriation of internally displaced persons to their villages and home areas, the Government of the Sudan concluded a memorandum of understanding with the International Organization for Migration on 21 August 2004 (copy of the memorandum of understanding is

[a] See S/2004/701/Add.1.

attached).[a]

(g) Political settlement

With regard to the resumption of political talks, it is worth noting that the Government sent to Abuja a high-level delegation fully empowered to reach a political settlement with the rebels in Darfur. The delegation is currently engaged in the process of peace talks organized by the African Union. It is the conviction of the Government that the Naivasha protocols represent a suitable basis for the resolution of the Darfur problem and other similar problems in the country.

(h) Popular participation

(i) To ensure the popular participation of tribal and native leaders from Darfur in the solution of the problem, the Government of the Sudan organized the Local and Native Leaders Conference in Khartoum on 7 and 8 August 2004. The Native Administration Act is ready for immediate adoption and application;

(ii) The Government of the Sudan is planning to convene an all-inclusive Darfur conference after the conclusion of the Abuja talks with a view to enabling all representatives to participate in the conference.

2. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Security Council resolution 1556 (2004)

(a) African Union monitors and their protection force

(i) The Government of the Sudan signed the N'Djamena Ceasefire Agreement on 8 April 2004, which provided for the international monitoring for the ceasefire;

(ii) The Government of the Sudan welcomed and received the first team of African Union monitors on 3 June 2004. The number of monitors now stands at 142;

(iii) The Government of the Sudan has provided the Ceasefire Commission with a helicopter (Mi-8) and continues to meet the cost of the fuel (Jet A-1) for the helicopter;

(iv) The Government of the Sudan received a contingent of 155 from Rwanda to join the protection force for the monitors on 14 August 2004. The Sudanese Armed Forces provided them with the required needs. Another contingent of the protection force from Nigeria is expected to arrive in Darfur soon after an American company completes construction of the camp site in Darfur.

3. Constraints of implementation

(a) Notwithstanding the relentless efforts by the Government of the Sudan to fulfil its obligations under Security Council resolution 1556 (2004) and the Darfur Plan of Action, practical difficulties are being encountered in implementation. The Government of the Sudan appeals to the international community to meet its obligations under paragraphs 12 and 13 of resolution 1556 (2004); so far only 50 per cent of the humanitarian needs are covered. The Government of the Sudan appeals to the donor community to fund the consolidated appeals process for the Sudan. It is worth noting that the needy people in Darfur have already lost the rainy season, which means that continued support to the people in Darfur will be necessary throughout the next year;

(b) The Government of the Sudan appeals to the international community to come to its assistance by providing logistical support to the police force in Darfur to raise its capability of quick movement in terms of communication and transportation by land and air to efficiently bring about security and stability in the region. Rehabilitation of the railway lines and locomotives is an urgent need to achieve cost effectiveness in the transportation of emergency relief to Darfur. All locomotives are American-made: the administration of the United States of America should be urged to release the necessary spare parts for those engines to be made operational for humanitarian purposes;

(c) Despite the provisions contained in paragraph 8 of resolution 1556 (2004), the Government of Eritrea continues its subversive behaviour by providing logistical and technical training to the rebel movements operating in Darfur. The Security Council, however, is expected to call upon Eritrea to cease those activities and to comply without delay with paragraph 8 of resolution 1556 (2004).

(d) One of the major constraints to implementation are the sporadic violations of the ceasefire in Darfur. The Ceasefire Commission and the African monitors are investigating those violations, as a result of which the number is falling as time passes;

2. Finally, I would like to reiterate once again the readiness and dedication of the Government of the Sudan to abide by resolution 1556 (2004) and other international instruments relating to human rights and international humanitarian law. The Government of the Sudan stands ready to reach a political settlement and to re-establish law and order in Darfur.

3. Attached please find the relevant documentation on the implementation of resolution 1556 (2004) and the Darfur Plan of Action.[a]

(*Signed*) Dr. Mustafa Osman **Ismail**
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Sudan

United Nations A/58/881–S/2004/702

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Fifty-eighth session
Agenda items 67 and 156

Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security

Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Fifty-ninth year

Identical letters dated 31 August 2004 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I am writing to draw your attention to the most recent, and unspeakably horrific, Palestinian terrorist attack perpetrated against the citizens of Israel.

Today, at 2.50 p.m. local time, two suicide bombers blew themselves up in near-simultaneous attacks on buses in the Israeli city of Be'er Sheva. At least sixteen Israelis were murdered in these explosions, and over one hundred more were maimed. A three-year-old boy was among the dead, the latest of the many young victims of Palestinian terror. In their leaflet proudly claiming responsibility for the attack, the Palestinian terror group Hamas, which receives active support from Iran and Syria and operates freely in Palestinian Authority territory, even added a threat to recent immigrants to Israel, saying to them, "This is your fate, so wait."

Early reports indicate that the bombers and their accomplices likely came from the West Bank town of Hebron, infiltrating into Israel in an area where the security fence has yet to be erected. In contrast, in areas where the security fence has already been completed, there have been no successful terror attacks in Israel for five months, despite a steady stream of attempts. Today's attack is a tragic illustration of the unfortunate need for the security fence.

Earlier in the day Israeli forces foiled a suicide attack when a Palestinian terrorist, posing as a labourer, attempted to infiltrate into Israel from Gaza with an explosive device hidden in his trousers. This incident illustrates, yet again, the willingness of Palestinian terrorists to exploit the passage granted to innocent Palestinian civilians so as to pursue their murderous campaign. As a result, they endanger not only the innocent Israeli civilians they target, but the life and

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livelihood of ordinary Palestinians whom they hide amongst in violation of the most basic human rights and humanitarian norms.

The Palestinian leadership's ongoing refusal to live up to its moral and legal obligations, including those in the very first clauses of phase I of the Road Map, to fight terrorism and the infrastructure that supports it, remains the key obstacle to progress. Instead of living up to their binding legal obligations, and thus paving the way for peaceful dialogue, the Palestinian side is busily engaged in diversionary tactics, cheap propaganda and accusations, including in United Nations forums, that pretend that the Palestinian side has rights but no responsibilities and compel Israel to engage in defensive measures. The cost of this morally bankrupt strategy is paid in the lives of innocents, the stagnation in the peace process, and the suffering of both Israelis and Palestinians. As long as it continues in the criminal abdication of its responsibilities, encouraging and glorifying terrorist action instead of actively confronting it, Israel will be compelled to adopt the necessary defensive measures in accordance with international law and its inherent right of self-defence, to protect its citizens.

Israel calls upon the international community not to tolerate Palestinian attempts to divert attention from their absolute duty to fight terrorism, which is the enemy of both peoples, and the greatest single obstacle to progress on the Road Map. In this context, we call on the international community to reaffirm its absolute rejection of terrorist tactics, and to accept nothing less than the complete dismantling of terrorist organizations, and relentless efforts to prevent terrorism and bring its perpetrators and supporters to justice, in accordance with international law and Security Council resolution, in particular resolution 1373 (2001).

I submit this letter in follow-up to numerous letters detailing the campaign of Palestinian terrorism launched in September 2000, which document the crimes for which the terrorists and their supporters must be held fully accountable.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of this letter circulated as an official document of the fifty-eighth session of the General Assembly, under agenda items 156 and 67. An identical letter is being submitted to the President of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Dan **Gillerman**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative